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This study addresses the European Union’s legal order with a view to the EU’s 
eastern enlargement. The authors argue that future membership of Central and 
Eastern European countries will severely strain the application, enforcement and 
supervision of EU law. This is why they scrutinise and evaluate various possible 
reforms to mitigate this pressure on the EU’s legal order. On the basis of the 
evaluations, the authors present ways to revamp the European Union’s enforce-
ment and supervisory systems. 
 
This working document has been written for the project ‘Enlargement of the EU to 
Central and Eastern Europe’, which the Netherlands Scientific Council for Govern-
ment Policy (WRR) is currently undertaking. As such, it contributes to answering 
the central questions of this project: to what extent will enlargement increase 
(disruptive) diversity within the Union, and, hence, to what extent will reform of 
existing institutions and practices be needed to maintain their effectiveness, 
legitimacy and cohesion? 
 
The authors of this study are Deirdre Curtin, Professor of Law of International 
Organisations, and Ronald van Ooik, University Lecturer in the Law of Inter-
national Organisations, both at the Europa Instituut, Utrecht University. 
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1 BACKGROUND AND PARAMETERS OF THE REPORT 
At the end of 1999 the Helsinki Summit confirmed, following earlier political 
statements, that accession negotiations should begin with thirteen candidates, 
including ten Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs).1 The European 
Council thus blurred the initial distinction made between a leading group of six 
countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Cyprus) and 
another group of six countries which would possibly accede at a later stage 
(Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Malta).2  
 
This firm political commitment inevitably entails substantial change, both in the 
candidate states and within the legal and institutional systems of the European 
Union itself. The reforms required in the Central and Eastern European States are 
framed by the three criteria laid down by the European Council in 1993 at 
Copenhagen. These are that membership of the European Union requires: 
1 that the candidate state has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities,  
2 the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, and 
3 the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to 
the aims of political, economic and monetary union.3  
 
At a later stage these requirements were worked out in greater detail by the 
various EU institutions in the process placing numerous very specific obligations 
on the candidate countries. The first Copenhagen criterion appears to embrace all 
kinds of political requirements, such as the obligation on Romania to reform its 
child care institutions.4 The European Council’s dictate to banish Das Kapital 
meant, inter alia, that the Eastern candidates were (de facto) forced to introduce 
legislation on such ‘capitalist’ matters as intellectual property rights and public 
procurement procedures.5 The third general criterion (‘the ability to take on the 
obligations of membership’) embraces the obligation for the CEECs to transpose, 
apply, and supervise the entire body of EU law. In order to perform the requisite 
incorporation activities properly, it is obvious that the new members should have 
sound legislative, administrative and judicial entities at their disposal.6 These 
‘hardware’ requirements can therefore be viewed as part and parcel of the third 
Copenhagen criterion. In practice, however, the requirement that the CEECs should 
have sufficient administrative and judicial capacity is seen as an additional fourth 
criterion. The reason is that it was only at a later stage, at the 1995 Madrid 
Summit, that the candidate countries were ‘requested’ to adapt their administra-
tive structures so as to guarantee the harmonious implementation of Community 
policies after membership.7 
 
It is however not only the would-be members but also the European Union itself 
which will have to undergo change in order to be ready for the next enlargement.  
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It is generally recognised that the institutional structures that were created for an 
economic Community of only six Member States are no longer adequate for a po-
litical Union of fifteen states, let alone some twenty-five or even thirty members.8  
 
With a view to introducing the requisite institutional changes the Intergovern-
mental Conference (IGC) on institutional reforms was convened at the beginning of 
the year 2000. The three so-called ‘left-overs’ from the Amsterdam IGC in 1997 are 
prominent on the agenda (size and composition of the European Commission, the 
weighting of votes in the Council of the EU, further extension of qualified majority 
voting in the Council), as well as other related institutional issues, such as the 
functioning of the EU Courts (Court of Justice and Court of First Instance), the 
further extension of the scope of the co-decision procedure in order to strengthen 
the powers of the European Parliament (including, in particular, the coupling of 
co-decision with qualified majority voting in the Council), and, perhaps, the split-
ting of the EU Treaties into two parts. Moreover, it seems that a few political issues 
will be added to the agenda as well, such as the idea to adopt a Charter on funda-
mental human rights and the creation of a common defence policy.9  
 
It follows that the distinction made in the Amsterdam Treaty between limited ad-
justment (in the case of accession of at least one new member) and fuller reforms 
(where membership of the Union would exceed twenty members) has lost its 
significance.10 The new goal is to address all questions relating to the proper func-
tioning of an international organisation that will change fundamentally through 
enlargement. If no major mishap occurs in the planning, the Treaty of Nice will 
form the apotheosis of the intergovernmental conference by agreeing on necessary 
amendments to the Treaties by the end of 2000.11  
 
Given these crucial on-going developments it is understandable that virtually all 
the attention – in particular in political circles – is focused on this process of en-
larging the Union. Moreover it is certain that for the next five years or so, the 
central focus will continue to be directed at the many pre-accession perils.  
 
Despite these current realities, this report will not analyse and discuss the prob-
lems which may arise during the current pre-accession period. Rather, the focus 
and thrust of our report relates to the period after the accession of some, if not all, 
of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe has actually taken place. In this 
post-accession period – which presumably will start somewhere around 2005 – it 
is generally believed that the actual application and enforcement of EU law in the 
new Member States will constitute one of the major problems. This explains why 
the theme of our report relates primarily to the issues of application and enforce-
ment of EU law in the post-accession period. More specifically, the report focuses 
on the extent to which certain structural or endemic problems in the new Member 




It is not without significance that both the European Council and the Council of 
Ministers have already emphasised the importance of the matter. They stress that 
the incorporation of the so-called acquis communautaire into national legislation 
is not in itself sufficient to ensure that the obligations of membership are fulfilled; 
the new Member States will also be required to guarantee that this acquis is actual-
ly applied according to the same standards as those which apply generally within 
the Union. The view from the EU is clearly that there is a strong need for “incorpo-
rating the acquis into legislation and actually implementing and enforcing it”.12 
 
Of course, it can never be expected that it would only be the current fifteen 
members of the Union which would be required to take the implementation and 
enforcement of EU law seriously. The crucial point is, however, how such effective 
implementation and enforcement by the new members should be guaranteed, 
given the hypothesis that at the time of accession these countries will probably not 
be able to ensure the full and perfect incorporation of EU law into their national 
legal orders.  
 
Starting from the assumption that the next enlargement will indeed be ‘sub-
optimal’ mainly in terms of the administrative capacity of the new members to 
apply the acquis as a matter of daily practice as well as the capacity of the national 
judiciary to supervise the application of EU law by administrative authorities, this 
report purports to go beyond the rather obvious observation that there will be a 
serious enforcement problem in the accession aftermath. Several suggestions for 
reform, from the viewpoint of the EU itself and its legal system, will be discussed 
and analysed. This will include not only ideas which are currently ‘popular’ in 
political circles but also ideas which aim at strengthening the Union’s enforcement 
and compliance systems. 
 
In order to discuss these issues in a structured manner, a distinction is made 
between the several phases of – what we refer to as – the process of incorporation 
of EU law into the national legal orders of (new) Member States. Incorporation 
covers different stages relating to the way in which EU law becomes an integral part 
of a domestic legal order.  
The first relevant stage of the incorporation process relates to the question 
whether or not a certain part of EU law has legal force for a (new) Member State.  
If this is not the case then the subsequent stages of the incorporation process (that 
is, transformation, application and supervision) do not have to be considered. This 
means that our attention must first and foremost focus on the question if and how 
EU law acquires legal force in and for a certain Member State. In this context the 
issue of flexibility is briefly discussed from the limited perspective of its putative 
role as an instrument to avoid problems relating to the transformation, application 
and supervision of EU law in the legal orders of the CEECs (Part A).13 
 
Once a certain part of EU law has indeed acquired legal force for a given Member 
State, it is assumed that this Member State has subsequently the legal obligation to 
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incorporate that part (primary and/or secondary EU law) into its national legal 
order. The other parts of the study (B-D) therefore depart from the assumption 
that a CEEC is indeed under a legal obligation to give full effect to specific parts of 
the Union’s acquis. With regard to this situation, it is useful to analyse the tasks 
and roles of Montesquieu’s three traditional powers within a state (legislative, ad-
ministrative and judicial).  
 
Part B of the study thus focuses on the role and tasks of the national legislator in 
the incorporation process. Its central task is to ensure that national legislative 
provisions are in conformity with EU law. This duty often requires the transpo-
sition of EU law provisions into national legislative provisions. Part C concentrates 
on the role of national administrative organs (national ministries, Competition 
Boards, et cetera). Very often it is their responsibility to ensure that EU law is cor-
rectly applied in daily life, usually vis-à-vis individuals (citizens, entrepreneurs, 
firms, et cetera). Part D of the study deals with supervisory functions, usually to be 
exercised by judicial organs. As far as EC/EU law is concerned, both the national 
courts (at the decentralised level) and the two Courts in Luxembourg (at a central 
level) perform these supervisory tasks. As we are mainly concerned with (pro-
jected) incorporation perils in the CEECs, the focus is on judicial supervision of 
national acts.  
 
Upon closer consideration, it, however, appears that EU law also embraces various 
forms of – what might be called – administrative supervision. This form of super-
vision is not exercised by an independent judicial body (at national or Union level) 
but by political entities, in particular by the Council of Ministers of the EU. One of 
these forms of administrative supervision is discussed in greater detail, namely in 
case of serious and persistent breaches by Member States of certain fundamental 
principles (Article 7 TEU). The reason is that the Amsterdam Treaty inserted this 
provision precisely with a view to the next enlargement (although current Member 
States – for example Austria – might be subject to this supervisory mechanism as 
well). 
 
The report is structured in the above manner so as to facilitate the central purpose 
of the study, namely to discuss various possibilities for reforming existing EU en-
forcement and supervisory systems which may be necessary in view of the coming, 
unprecedented, enlargement.  
 
Most parts of the study follow a similar approach. First the existing legal situation, 
in a Union of fifteen Member States, is analysed (although rather briefly). The 
focus is on describing and considering possible reforms to the existing legal situa-





If necessary, a distinction is drawn between two different groups of possible 
reforms: those aiming at a ‘weakening’ of the present situation (seen from the 
point of view of effective incorporation and protection of EU law at the national 
level), and reforms aiming at a further strengthening of existing mechanisms and 
structures. The study therefore strives towards more objectivity than some of the 
documents which have been recently submitted by various EU institutions in the 
framework of the IGC on institutional reforms. 
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 1 Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council (10 and 11 December 1999), 
Chapter I, point 4. 
2 This distinction was still made in, for example, the Commission’s Agenda 
2000. The missing country, namely Turkey, was only considered to be a po-
tential candidate for EU membership at the Helsinki Summit. The European 
Council’s conclusions are, however, much more reluctant as compared to the 
intentions regarding the other twelve candidates. The human rights situation 
and the Turkish ‘occupation’ of Cyprus continue to constitute the key prob-
lems (cf. points 4, 9 and 12 of the Helsinki Conclusions). 
3 Bull. C (1993/6), p. 12 (point I.13). 
4 See the Second Regular Report from the Commission on Romania, 13 October 
1999 (Chapter B.2). 
5 See, for example, the Commission’s Opinion, First and Second Report on 
Bulgaria. From the latest report it appears, in any event, that this candidate 
has made good progress in the two areas mentioned, at least as far as the 
adoption of formal legislation is concerned. 
6 See below for a more precise definition of these terms (transposition, applica-
tion, supervision, incorporation). 
7 See the Madrid conclusions, under III, point A. See also A.J.G. Verheijen 
(2000), Administrative Capacity Development for EU membership: A Race 
Against Time?, WRR Working Documents no. W 107, The Hague 
 8 In this report, the terms ‘European Union (law)’ and ‘European Community 
(law)’ are deliberately distinguished. It is, however, not the purpose of the 
report to explain – once again – the complex three-pillar-structure of the post-
Amsterdam European Union. On the matter, see e.g. T. Heukels, N. Blokker 
and M. Brus (1998) (eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam. A Legal 
Analysis Kluwer. 
9 For the Commission’s contribution to the discussions, see, in particular, its 
opinion of 26 January 2000, entitled Adapting the Institutions to make a 
success of enlargement. See also its earlier contribution of 10 November 1999 
(Adapting the Institutions to make a success of enlargement: a Commission 
contribution to the preparations for the Inter-Governmental Conference on 
institutional issues). Regarding the idea to ‘reorganise’ the Treaties, see in 
particular the Report by R. von Weizsäcker, J. Dehaene and D. Simon, ‘The 
Institutional Implications of Enlargement’, Report to the European 
Commission, Brussels, 18 October 1999 (Report Dehaene). For the priorities 
of the Dutch government, see the note IGC-2000: een agenda voor de interne 
hervormingen van de Europese Unie’ (TK, 1999-2000, 21 501-20, no. 101, p. 
13). 
 10 See the Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the 
European Union. Article 1 of this Protocol stipulates that, at the date of entry 
into force of the first enlargement, the Commission shall comprise one 
national of each Member State, provided that, by that date, the weighting of 
the votes in the Council has been modified. According to Article 2 an IGC shall 
be convened in order to carry out a comprehensive review of the Treaty 
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provisions on the composition and functioning of the institutions, at least one 
year before EU membership exceeds twenty. See also the critical Declaration 
by Belgium, France and Italy on this Protocol (OJ 1997 C 340: 111 and 144) and 
P. VerLoren van Themaat (2000) ‘Enkele problemen voor de komende IGC’, 
NTER 34. 
11 See the Helsinki Conclusions, point 15. 
12 Helsinki Conclusions, point 11. On the definition of the terms ‘acquis of the 
Union’ and ‘acquis communautaire’, see paragraph 3. 
13 The wider implications of the concept of flexibility are not addressed here as 
they constitute the subject matter of Eric Philippart and Monika Sie Dhian Ho 
(forthcoming) Pedalling against the wind; Strategies to Strengthen the EU’s 
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2 PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF PART A  
Before discussing the various stages of the incorporation process, it should first be 
stressed that the CEECs will only be required to transpose, apply and supervise EU 
law if this body of ‘external’ law has gained legal force for and in these countries. If 
not, the incorporation of EU law would be irrelevant, since there would be no 
formal legal obligation on the CEEC authorities to respect EU law. It is logical there-
fore in this perspective to pay attention first to the question when and how EU law 
gains legal force for these countries. It transpires on closer examination that in fact 
two conditions have to be met. First, quite obviously, these countries should ac-
tually join the Union. Assuming that, by the time of accession, the Union has not 
changed its forms of membership (affiliated, associated, etc.), in principle, all EU 
law provisions will gain legal force for a new member (paragraph 3).  
 
If this first condition is met, then an EU law provision will only gain legal force in a 
(new) Member State if it is declared applicable to this country. This can be viewed 
as the second condition and it is in this regard that some attention is given to the 
issue of flexibility (or: ‘closer co-operation’). Even if it is certainly not the principle 
objective of this study to analyse the various forms of flexibility,1 some attention 
should in our view be given to the relationship between this ‘input’ issue and the 
‘output’ issue of incorporation. Flexibility may have the concrete consequence that 
the output (the final EC or EU decision) does not apply to a certain country. It 
would follow that no problems regarding the incorporation of EU law in the 
national legal order could arise in these circumstances (paragraph 4). 
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NOTES 
1 See Eric Philippart and Monika Sie Dhian Ho (forthcoming) Pedalling against 
the wind; Strategies to Strengthen the EU’s Capacity to Act in the Context of 
Enlargement, WRR Working Documents no. W115.  
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3 ACTUAL ACCESSION AS A PRECONDITION FOR THE 
LEGAL FORCE OF EU LAW IN THE CEECS 
Although one gets the strong impression that the candidates are already bound to 
assume all EU membership obligations, this is – at least from the legal point of 
view – certainly not the case. The Copenhagen criteria, for example, are not legally 
binding on any of the candidates, as they are embodied in a unilateral document of 
an EU organ.1 This is also the case with regard to Commission opinions, White 
Papers, (regular) Reports and suchlike. At the moment, the only legal obligations 
on the CEECs can be found in the respective Europe Agreements, since these agree-
ments were concluded with each of the candidates and have actually entered into 
force.2 They can be characterised as bilateral agreements, between the EU and its 
current Member States on the one hand, and one of the ten Eastern candidates on 
the other.3 
 
Despite the limited legal rights and obligations for the CEECs contained in these 
Europe Agreements, one may speak of a much broader de facto obligation for 
these countries to align their legal systems to almost all EU standards. After all, if 
the candidates do not take the third Copenhagen criterion very seriously, accession 
at a later stage seems rather unlikely.  
 
Be that as it may, it is only upon actual accession that the entire (existing) body of 
EU law will formally acquire formal legal force for the CEECs. Although this is not 
explicitly stated in the EU Treaty, it can be deduced from the fact that the Union 
recognises only one form of membership, namely full membership. Unlike many 
other international organisations, the Union does not recognise associated or af-
filiated memberships. States are either in or they are out. The fact that the Acces-
sion Treaties may exempt the new members from certain obligations, does not 
detract from the general principle that accession to the Union entails the accept-
ance by the new Member State of all legal obligations.4 
 
The ‘entire body of EU law’ may also be referred to as the acquis of the Union. 
Although rather vague, this acquis (of the Union) can be described as all legal rules 
originating from the Union as a separate legal entity.5 More concretely, it embraces 
rights and obligations contained in the EU Treaty, that is, all provisions of the three 
so-called EU pillars as well as the provisions of the (three) general titles. It further 
covers the thousands of decisions of the EU institutions, the secondary law of the 
Union.6 Last but certainly not least, the existing case law of the EU Courts forms 
part and parcel of the acquis of the Union. The CEECs, once admitted as new 
members, will therefore also have to comply with the existing jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, including its case law on such 
fundamental principles as direct effect, supremacy and state liability.7 
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Given that the Court’s jurisdiction is mainly related to the first pillar of the Union 
(the EC Treaties), the entire body of case law can also be included, more specifically, 
within the acquis communautaire. This, often used, term refers to all aspects of 
traditional European Community law (EC Treaties, secondary Community law, case 
law of the Court). The term acquis communautaire should therefore be seen as only a 
part – albeit an important one – of the broader concept of the acquis of the Union. 
This distinction emphasises that the newcomers will have to accept existing law in 
the fields of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Police and Judicial 
Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC) as well. 
 
It is difficult indeed to predict whether or not this first condition for EU law to gain 
legal force in the CEECs (whether the CEECs will actually accede to the Union) will ever 
be fulfilled. Let us just conclude that the actual accession of any new member cannot 
as yet be taken for granted. Article 49 of the EU Treaty stipulates that the unanimous 
approval of the Council (that is, in practice, the fifteen Heads of State and Govern-
ment of the Member States) is necessary. Moreover, the agreement between the 
current Member States and the applicant State concerning the conditions of admis-
sion must be ratified by all contracting States in accordance with their constitutional 
requirements. In some Member States ratification means that a prior referendum on 
enlargement of the Union to the East will need to be held.8 It follows that one sole 
government, or the majority of the population of just one Member State could block 
the accession of any CEEC for a long period of time, if not indefinitely. In the past a 
similar ratification requirement already brought the Union on the brink of an im-
possible situation when a majority of the Danish population refused to accept the 
Maastricht Treaty. The main Danish concerns at that time related to the Maastricht 
provisions on citizenship, foreign policy and - more generally - to the idea of losing 
too much sovereignty.9  
 
This time the obligation to accept free movement of persons (with CEEC nationality, 
including workers and economically inactive persons) may become one of the biggest 
political issues. Even though the Accession Treaties will certainly provide for long 
transitional periods,10 one day after enlargement the movement of workers can no 
longer be restricted. After all, Article 39 EC explicitly stipulates that “freedom of 
movement for workers shall be secured within the Community”.11  
 
In any event, in ‘high’ political circles, a strong will exists to expand the Union into a 
larger political and economic entity. The firm political commitment displayed at the 
Helsinki European Council has already been referred to. Some years earlier the 
Madrid European Council stated that enlargement is “both a political necessity and a 
historic opportunity for Europe”.12 And according to the European Parliament “there 
can be no question of delaying the enlargement process, remembering in particular 
the hardships suffered by Central and Eastern European Countries through more 
than forty years of dictatorship”.13 
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If we view the perspective of enlargement from the vantage point of the acceding 
States themselves, a similar optimistic picture can be painted. Political leaders and 
governments of many Eastern European countries have described membership of 
the Union as a ‘top political priority’.14 Yet, more recently there are some signs that a 
number of these countries may wish to break the spell and re-discuss the desirability 
of EU membership. One of the main reasons for this tendency towards a more critical 
approach is that some of these countries have discovered the one-way nature of the 
EU membership process, leaving very little room for the candidates to achieve their 
specific wishes and priorities. 
 
At any rate, from the legal point of view, actual accession constitutes the first con-
dition for EU law to gain legal force in the CEECs. If this hurdle is taken, all parts of EU 
law will, in principle, have legal force for these new members. Only at a later stage 
will the issue of providing exceptions to this fundamental principle (namely flexible 
legislation) be relevant.  
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1 See on the legal status of this document: P.C. Müller-Graff, ‘The Legal 
Framework for the Enlargement of the Internal Market to Central and Eastern 
Europe’ (1992) Maastricht Journal, 192, at 198. 
2 The Agreements concluded with Hungary (OJ 1993 L 347/1) and Poland (OJ 
1993 L 348/1) entered into force on 1 January 1994. A year later the Europe 
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4 FLEXIBILITY AS AN INSTRUMENT TO AVOID 
INCORPORATION PERILS 
In this report, flexibility is considered as a means to create exceptions to the 
general rule that the entire body of EU law gains legal force for a (new) member.  
If and when such an exception is created, the Member State concerned will not 
have to incorporate this part of EU law and, as a consequence, problems relating to 
transposition, application and supervision cannot arise. 
 
If flexibility is viewed from this perspective, issues such as the categorisation of the 
various forms of flexibility or a detailed examination of the conditions of Article 11 
TEC are of less importance.1 What we are rather interested in for the purposes of 
the present report is the more specific question of the extent to which flexibility 
can offer a means of avoiding incorporation perils in the new Member States. In 
this regard, it is useful to draw a distinction between the existing acquis and the 
new acquis which will arise after accession. 
 
 
4.1 NON-APPLICABILITY OF THE EXISTING ACQUIS UPON ACCESSION 
For the incoming members various forms of flexibility could be agreed upon in 
order to avoid problems with the transposition, application and supervision of 
existing EU law. Most likely, such forms of flexibility will be laid down in the 
various Accession Treaties. Transitional periods can only offer a temporary solu-
tion, as some time after accession the legal obligations concerned (e.g. regarding 
free movement of persons or regarding state aid) will in any event gain legal force. 
More structural exemptions would offer a ‘better’ solution, at least if they are seen 
as a means of avoiding incorporation problems.  
 
In this regard, a strong argument in favour of such structural exemptions is the 
fact that the Union’s present legal order already contains a significant number of 
different forms of so-called pre-determined flexibility. Examples can be found in 
the Protocols on the position of the UK and Ireland, and Denmark. These Protocols 
stipulate that acts adopted under Title IV of the EC Treaty (on asylum, immi-
gration, etc.) shall, in principle, not be binding on these three Member States and 
such acts shall not be applicable to them. Logically, these countries do not take 
part in the adoption of Title IV acts.2 In a similar way, it could be stated (in the 
Accession Treaties) that Title IV and decisions taken under this Title, in principle, 
do not apply to the new Member State in question. It would in these circumstances 
be for the individual Member State concerned to determine whether and to what 
extent it wishes to be bound by such Community acts.  
 
Another (controversial) example, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, was the 
‘opt-out’ of the UK in the field of social policy. The Protocol and Agreement on 
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Social Policy did not apply to this Member State, nor did – at the secondary level – 
the Directives adopted under these arrangements. As a result, an important part of 
the Community’s social legislation (initially) did not apply to this country.3 
Although the Amsterdam Treaty put an end to the special position of the UK,4 
similar arrangements could be revived in one or more Accession Treaties. 
 
In any event, it is suggested that this form of flexibility (‘pre-determined’) can only 
offer a limited solution to the expected incorporation perils. From the various pre-
accession documents it clearly appears that the candidates are required to accept 
almost the entire acquis of the Union which will exist at the moment of accession. 
This includes, inter alia, the acceptance of the entire Schengen acquis5 even though 
three of the current Member States have obtained ‘special’ treatment in this 
regard.6 Few exceptions to the rule seem therefore to be acceptable to the EU. If 
such exceptions are accepted at all the general view is that they should be limited 




4.2 NON-APPLICABILITY OF NEW ACQUIS AFTER ENLARGEMENT 
As far as new EU legislation is concerned, that is, legal acts adopted after the 
accession of the CECs, the general flexibility clauses of the Amsterdam Treaty  
(Title VII, Article 11 TEC, Article 40 TEU) offer good prospects to avoid the problems 
related to the transposition, application and supervision of EC/EU law in and by the 
new members. These Treaty provisions on ‘closer co-operation’ essentially aim at 
enabling the institutions to adopt secondary legislation which does not apply to all 
Member States (although it should apply to at least a majority of the Member 
States).7 For present purposes, it is important to assess whether these Amsterdam 
clauses can really provide an adequate means of avoiding incorporation problems 
in the CEECs. Of course, the pending enlargement was precisely one of the major 
reasons why the new provisions on closer co-operation were inserted into the EC 
Treaty and the EU Treaty. It was feared that the increased heterogeneity between 
the Member States would paralyse the Union’s legislative processes. 8 In its 
opinion of 26 January 2000, the Commission stressed once again that countries 
wishing to intensify their co-operation should not be hampered by other members 
lagging behind.9 Flexibility should in its view constitute the ultimate solution to 
the wish to both ‘deepen’ and ‘widen’ the Union. 
 
There are, nevertheless, several reasons which support the view that the general 
Amsterdam provisions only offer a limited solution to the expected difficult 
incorporation problems in the CEECs.  
 
First, a major legal obstacle to flexible decision-making is that the Treaty contains 
numerous conditions which have to be fulfilled before a Community or Union act 
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may be adopted in this manner. Flexibility under the EC Treaty in particular, is 
subject to a number of strict conditions. These include the requirement that closer 
co-operation does not concern areas which fall within the exclusive competence of 
the Community (Article 11(1)(a) EC) and that closer co-operation does not ‘affect’ 
Community policies, actions or programmes (article 11(1)(b) EC).  
 
If these requirements are indeed taken seriously, it seems that there is very little 
room for adopting ‘flexible’ decisions under the EC Treaty. In particular, Directives 
and Regulations adopted under Article 95 EC (‘internal market legislation’) must 
apply to all Member States, as the establishment and the functioning of the in-
ternal market must be considered as an area which falls within the exclusive 
competence of the Community. Likewise, the CEECs will have to be bound by Com-
munity acts in the field of commercial policy (based on EC competence,10 so that 
secondary legislation in this field – adopted after the accession of the CEECs – 
cannot restrict its scope ratione territorii to just a few Member States. This means 
in effect that only relatively few areas are left open to flexible arrangements. Areas 
such as environmental protection and the harmonisation of (direct and indirect) 
taxes are often quoted as examples where flexible legislation could take place.11 
 
Secondly, even where the Amsterdam provisions (renewed or not) allow for 
flexible solutions, a majority of the Member States may prefer to ‘outvote’ the 
minority, instead of adopting a decision which merely applies to them. After all, 
closer co-operation can easily occasion distortions of competition, for instance if 
only a few Member States are required to adopt stringent rules on the emission of 
CO2. For economic reasons therefore a majority of the Member States may be very 
reluctant to resort too easily to the Amsterdam provisions on flexibility but rather 
use qualified majority voting (QMV) as a means to ‘suppress diversity’.12 Conse-
quently, in areas such as social policy and public health, the CEECs have to bear in 
mind that they may be bound by secondary acts. In case the Council indeed 
decides by a majority, the final decision will apply to all Member States. 
 
Of course, this route can only be followed if the Treaty provision used as the legal 
basis for the secondary act in question does indeed provide for QMV. However, 
most legal bases of the EC Treaty already provide for majority voting. Moreover, by 
the time the first wave of new guests enter the European structure, the number of 
legal bases providing for majority voting will probably have increased further, 
since this is one of the central institutional issues of the IGC 2000. The main reason 
for this development is that political and/or economic interests of the various 
members of the Council will become so diversified that the working of the Union 
can easily be blocked. It therefore seems that general support is emerging for the 
idea that qualified majority voting in the Council should become the rule, subject 
to only a few exceptions for some fundamental or highly sensitive issues.13  
 
In this respect it should be stressed that the formal possibility of QMV does not 
mean that Members States are actually outvoted. Political will is in addition re-
REVAMPING THE EUROPEAN UNION’S ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS  
WITH A VIEW TO EASTERN ENLARGEMENT 
30 
quired among the members of the Council to outvote a minority, in the event that 
this is considered necessary or desirable. In the past this political will was clearly 
absent, so that there never was a real risk of being bound involuntarily, even if QMV 
was formally possible. In important areas such as agriculture and transport policy 
this was indeed the case already before the end of the transitional period (1970).14 
These days, however, the influence of the so-called Luxembourg Compromise has 
considerably diminished. The members of the Council have become less reluctant 
to outvote their minority colleagues and thus bind them involuntarily. In this way 
the British were told that it was a good thing to introduce maximum work hours; 
the Dutch were obliged to protect biotechnological inventions; and the Germans 
will have to ban tobacco advertisements, since the relevant Directive was adopted 
by a majority. Cases subsequently brought before the Court (under Article 230 EC) 
in order to challenge the legal basis of such decisions are usually unsuccessful.15 
 
 
4.3 POST-ENLARGEMENT: SPECIFIC FLEXIBILITY PROVISIONS 
Apart from the general provisions on flexibility, mentioned above, the EU Treaty 
also contains some more specific provisions which enable the institutions to adopt 
secondary acts which do not apply to all Member States. Again, these provisions 
are examined from a specific point of view, namely to assess to CEEC. 
 
An example to be found in the Community pillar is the possibility that only 
‘certain’ Member States will participate in supplementary programmes in the field 
of research and technological development. The general rules applicable to these 
supplementary programmes will be adopted by the Council, including rules on the 
dissemination of knowledge and access by other Member States.16 As regards CFSP 
decision-making, the provision on ‘constructive abstention’ could be considered as 
a form of flexibility. In principle, decisions under Title V are binding on all 
Member States, even if a Member States abstains in a vote. In that event, however, 
the Member State concerned may ‘qualify’ its abstention by making a formal 
declaration under Article 23 (1) TEU. In that case, the Member State is not obliged 
to apply the CFSP decision in question, although it should accept that the decision 
commits the Union.  
 
In the third pillar, conventions on PJCC issues constitute the most important exam-
ple. They only have to be adopted by at least half of the Member States, and they 
shall enter into force for those Member States only (Article 34(2)(d) TEU). It, how-
ever, seems that this provision can only offer a temporary solution, as it is also 
stated that the Member States must ratify PJCC conventions. Hence, Article 
34(2)(d) TEU seems to contain the traditional ‘multiple-speed’ form of flexibility; it 
only provides a means to avoid incorporation problems within the CEECs for a 
certain period of time.  
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Moreover, Article 34 can only result in the inapplicability in a new Member State 
of conventions established after its accession. Third pillar conventions which have 
already entered into force upon accession, will probably have to be acceded to by 
the new Member States as they form part and parcel of the existing acquis of the 
Union. Article 34 TEU does not provide a solution for a new Member wishing to 
‘escape’, for example, its obligations laid down in the Europol Convention. As this 
Convention entered into force prior to Amsterdam (under the JHA version of the 
third pillar),17 the new Member States, in principle, have to become a party to this 
important Convention. Only specific arrangements in the Accession Treaties could 
change this state of affairs.18  
 
 
4.4 GENERAL ASSESSMENT (AND SOPHISTICATED HARMONISATION 
TECHNIQUES AS AN ALTERNATIVE) 
At the present moment it seems that there is only limited room for the would-be 
members to escape the obligation to adopt the entire existing acquis of the Union. 
The EU institutions have made it perfectly clear that, in principle, they will have to 
take over the entire body of EU law as it will stand on the moment of accession 
(including the entire Schengen acquis). Time will tell whether the Accession 
Treaties, nevertheless, contain substantial exceptions to this general principle. 
 
Regarding post-accession legislation, the importance of the general flexibility clauses 
of the EC/EUTreaty should not be underestimated. Nevertheless, a significant part of 
the yet to be developed Union legislation – acts adopted after actual accession – will 
gain legal force for the CEECs, and therefore will have to be incorporated as such. 
There are, indeed, additional means for avoiding incorporation problems (cf. the 
specific provisions discussed in paragraph 4.3), but these flexible provisions relate to 
specific areas of EU policy.  
 
Of course, the strict requirements of, in particular, Article 11 TEC could be ‘relaxed’ 
by amending the Treaty prior to accession. In this respect discussions are already 
going on, mainly in the framework of the current IGC on institutional reforms. The 
Commission, for example, proposes that at least one third of the Member States 
may establish closer co-operation between themselves and that the ‘Accord of 
Amsterdam’ should be deleted.19 It is however rather unlikely that closer co-opera-
tion will be extended to such key areas as the functioning of the internal market 
(including the four freedoms) and the Community’s commercial policy. Thus, the 
flexibility provisions will not always function as a means of avoiding the problems 
related to the incorporation of EU law in the CEECs. 
 
Given the limited possibilities and (economic) disadvantages of post-accession 
flexibility, one may wonder whether the adoption of minimum norms by the EU 
does not constitute a preferable compromise. All Member States (including the 
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CEECs) would be required to ensure that the minimum EC norm is respected - in 
this respect incorporation problems may still occur. But only the ‘willing and able’ 
Member States would have the possibility to adopt more stringent rules in their 
national legislation. Regarding this ‘extra’, the CEECs, or most of them, would not 
encounter incorporation EC legislates by means of Directives, the final result of this 
legal technique would be (more or less) uniform legislation in all Member States 
up to a certain minimum, plus stricter legislation in only a few Member States. 
 
This sophisticated legal technique has already been used by the EC in the past, 
notably in ‘semi-economic’ areas such as social policy, consumer protection and 
environmental protection. The Treaty even obliges the institutions to merely lay 
down minimum norms in these areas.20 In internal market legislation (acts based 
on Article 95 EC), on the other hand, the institutions quite often opt for so-called 
complete harmonisation. This means that Member States, in principle, do not have 
the possibility to maintain or introduce more stringent rules.21 A cumbersome 
procedure (laid down in paragraphs 4 to 9 of Article 95 EC) has to be followed, in-
cluding a positive decision from the Commission, to make sure that more stringent 
rules may continue to exist. It may therefore be very difficult for a Member State to 
maintain or adopt stricter rules in its own legal system.22 
 
In an enlarged Union it may be necessary to have recourse to this legal method 
much more often, be it as an alternative to ‘ordinary’ flexible decision-making 
under the general provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty (consumer policy, environ-
mental protection, etc.) or as an alternative to complete harmonisation in case the 
Article 11 conditions exclude the adoption of ‘flexible’ acts (for example internal 
market legislation). The main objective for probably all CEECs would be to reach 
only the required minimum EC level. Other Member States, often those which 
already have a high level of protection, would be free to maintain or introduce 
‘better’ national rules. 
 
Apart from minimum harmonisation, the legal technique of so-called optional 
harmonisation may also constitute an interesting option available from the arsenal 
of legislative methods already employed in the EC context. The term ‘optional har-
monisation’ has to date mainly been used in the context of the free movement of 
goods. This type of harmonisation entails that goods which fulfil the technical 
requirements of the Directive in question (often mentioned in extensive lists in the 
Annex to the Directive) must be able to circulate freely within the entire Commu-
nity. Such Directives do not, however, forbid the production of the same goods in 
accordance with national standards. These goods, not complying with the tech-
nical requirements as laid down in the Directive, can only circulate in the territory 
of the Member State where they have been produced. Other Member States are not 
obliged to accept imports of these goods, at least not on the basis of the Directive.23 
It is therefore the manufacturer – and not the Member State – who has been given 
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the possibility to choose: he may either produce in accordance with EC standards, 
or with local standards.24 
 
As this harmonisation technique is so specifically tied up with the context within 
which it was developed, namely the free movement of goods, it cannot (yet) be 
considered as an alternative to closer co-operation within the meaning of the new 
Amsterdam provisions, given the fact that the freedom of movement of goods 
(probably) falls within the area of exclusive Community competence.25 Neverthe-
less, it can be viewed as a more flexible solution than the technique of complete (or 
total) harmonisation, which does not leave the manufacturer the choice of opting 
for either EC standards or local standards.26 
 
More recently it seems that the term ‘optional harmonisation’ is also used in a 
quite different meaning, namely the one non-specialists on the free movement of 
goods would expect: it is up to the Member States to decide whether or not they 
implement all or certain provisions of the ‘optional’ EC/EU measure in national 
legislation. If the term is understood in this sense, the technique of optional har-
monisation could be fruitfully used in several areas of EU policy-making activity. 
PJCC framework decisions, for example, could provide that Member States are only 
obliged to implement certain provisions of this act, leaving it to these states to 
decide whether or not they implement the other parts. In case of complete dis-
cretion, one may however wonder whether the institutions should not adopt a 
common position or some other soft law act, such as an action plan. In any event, 
there is already some evidence in recent months that in the context of EU policies 
on Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal matters some suggestions have 
been made along these lines in the ongoing debate on criminal law harmonisation 
in the EU. Such ideas are complementary to recent initiatives on employing the 
principle of ‘mutual recognition’, borrowed from the area it has originally been 
developed, the free movement of goods, in the context of certain aspects of crim-
inal law procedure. We will return to consideration of this important recent trend 
in the concluding chapter.  
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later the Commission gave a negative decision (Decision 1999/5/EC, OJ 1999 L 
3, p. 13), thus requiring Sweden to abolish its complete ban on the use of 
colour E 124. 
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23  On the basis of primary EC law such an obligation may however still exist: 
Article 28 EC, on the prohibition of quantitive restrictions on imports and 
measures having equivalent effect, applies; and the Member State concerned 
cannot justify its import restrictions on the basis of Article 30 EC or one of the 
so-called Rule Of Reason-exceptions. See further the impressive analysis by 
Curall (1984) ‘Some Aspects of the Relation between Articles 30-36 and 
Article 100 of the EEC Treaty, with a Closer Look at Optional Harmonisation’, 
YEL 169. 
53 See also R.H. Lauwaars and J.M. Maarleveld (1987) Harmonisatie van 
wetgeving in Europese organisaties, Kluwer, p. 152. 
25  Cf. paragraph 4.2. 
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5 PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF PART B 
The term ‘transposition’ refers to the process of bringing national legislation of a 
certain Member State into conformity with those parts of EU law which have 
acquired legal force for that Member State. Transposition is therefore an activity 
which has to be performed, mainly, by the national legislative authorities. This 
obligation essentially results from the fact that EU law takes precedence over 
national law. It is relevant therefore to first address the case law of the Court 
regarding the relationship between EC law and national law (paragraph 6).  
 
The main purpose of this part is, however, to analyse possibilities for reform of the 
process of transposition of EU law by national legislative authorities, in the light of 
the upcoming enlargement. In this respect, attention is given to the choice of the 
legal instruments by the EU institutions and to the various forms of assistance 
which the EU can provide to the legislative authorities of the CEECs (paragraph 7). 
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6 THE OBLIGATION TO BRING NATIONAL LAW IN 
CONFORMITY WITH EU LAW 
Already as far back as 1964, the Court of Justice ruled that the integration of pro-
visions which derive from the Community into the laws of the Member States 
make it impossible for these states to accord precedence to any unilateral and sub-
sequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. 
Such a national measure cannot therefore be inconsistent with the Community 
legal system. The executive force of Community law cannot vary from one state to 
another and the obligations undertaken under the Treaty would not be uncondi-
tional, but merely contingent, if they could be called in question by subsequent 
legislative acts of the Member States. The Court therefore concluded that the law 
stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not be overridden 
by domestic legal provisions, without being deprived of its character as Commu-
nity law and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called into 
question.1  
 
Although lawyers tend to relate this case law on the principle of supremacy to the 
role of the national courts,2 the Court’s general wording also has extremely im-
portant consequences for national legislators. In fact, they have to ensure that all 
parts of national legislation become and remain in line with all EC Treaty obliga-
tions. In this respect, it is stressed that concepts such as direct effect and state 
liability were only developed because national legislators did not perform their 
duties properly. Direct effect and state liability should be considered, essentially, 
as forms of sanctions to be imposed on the legislator. The existence of these sanc-
tions does not, however, release the national legislator from its duty to transpose 
EU law correctly. Thus, the fact that a provision of an EC Directive may be relied 
upon before the national court by individuals, does not exempt the national legis-
lator from the obligation to adopt implementing measures within the period pre-
scribed in the Directive.3 
 
With regard to the transposition of the acts of the EU institutions (into national 
legislative provisions) a distinction should be made between Regulations and 
Directives. Because a Regulation is ‘directly applicable’ (Article 249 EC), the 
Member States are not permitted, in principle, to transpose the contents of a 
Regulation into national legislation. According to the Court, such implementing 
measures would create uncertainty as to the legal nature of the applicable provi-
sions and they would jeopardise the simultaneous and uniform application of the 
Regulation in the entire Community. Only where the Regulation itself provides for 
the adoption of implementing rules, the Member States may transpose its provi-
sions into national legal rules.4 In general, the entry into force and application of 
Regulations are independent of any measure of reception into national law.5  
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Regulations therefore have the most direct impact on the national legal order, as 
they usually do not need any intervention by the national legislatures for their ap-
plication. Although Regulations do not need formal transposition into national 
laws or regulations, the provisions of a Regulation should, of course, be applied by 
national administrative agencies.6 Directives, on the other hand, often require 
positive action on the part of the national legislators. Directives are merely binding 
with regard to the objective to be achieved, but leave it to the Member States to 
choose the ‘form and method’ (Article 249 EC). In practice, this means that the 
Member States must bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions necessary for them to comply with the Directive in question. These im-
plementing measures should have legally binding force, which implies that imple-
mentation of a Directive through circulars or administrative practices is not good 
enough.7 Directives are therefore a particularly useful device for the harmoni-
sation of national laws within a certain area or with regard to a certain topic.  
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1 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
2 On this issue, see paragraph 14.2. 
3 Case 102/79 Commission v Belgium [1980] ECR 1473, 1487. 
4 See, for example, Case 93/71 Leonesio [1972] 288. Cf. R.H. Lauwaars (1983) 
‘Implementation of Regulations by National Measures’, LIEI 41. 
5 Cf. Case 34/73 Variola [1973] ECR 981, paragraph 10.  
6 See, e.g., Case 17/67 Neumann [1967] ECR 441. 
7 See, e.g., Case C-361/88, Commission v Germany [1991] ECR I-2567 (the so-
called TA Luft case, discussed by C. Langenfeld and S. Schlemmer-Schulte 
(1991) ‘Die TA Luft – kein geeignetes Instrument zur Umsetzung von EG-
Richtlinien’, EuZW, p. 622). 
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7 POSSIBLE REFORMS TO THE EU SYSTEM 
The formal transposition of EU law into national legislation of the candidate 
countries does not seem to be the most problematic issue, at least in comparison 
with the expected problems related to the actual application and enforcement of 
EU law. Already during the pre-accession period, the Regular Reports from the 
Commission on the situation in the candidate countries show that, generally 
speaking, all countries have made good progress on the alignment of their legis-
lation to the Union’s acquis. Upon closer examination it appears however that in 
numerous specific policy areas national legislation has still not been brought into 
line with EU law. In particular, a number of EC Directives have not yet been trans-
posed into national legislation. In the field of free movement of goods a large 
number of candidates still have to start transposing the so-called New Approach 
Directives, as well as the directives on product safety and product liability. In the 
sensitive area of environmental protection, a majority of the candidates have not 
yet begun implementing Directives on chemicals, genetically modified organisms, 
and noise.1  
 
The new Member States are however not only obliged to bring their national law 
into line with the existing acquis; after accession they will also have to ensure that 
national law stays in line with new EC legislation. It is therefore important to ex-
amine what the EU can do in order to ensure that the new members will actually 




7.1 THE CHOICE OF THE LEGAL INSTRUMENT 
A first option to be considered relates to the type of acts which are at the disposal 
of the EU institutions in order to give shape to the various Union policies. The cen-
tral question in this context is whether there are possibilities of avoiding the obli-
gation to transpose EU law into national legislative provisions, and thus to avoid 
the ‘co-operation’ of national legislators.  
 
As the various EU pillars provide for very different legal instruments, a distinction 
is made between the EC pillar on the one hand (paragraph 7.1.1) and the two non-
Community pillars on the other (paragraph 7.1.2). 
 
 
7.1.1 WHAT KIND OF COMMUNITY LEGISLATION? 
A first option to avoid any transposition problem is to adopt legally non-binding 
Community acts, such as opinions, recommendations, conclusions, announce-
ments, et cetera. It however seems that in the ‘hard core’ areas of Community 
policy, a significant trend towards the adoption of ‘soft’ law is not very likely.  
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After all, in its fifty years of existence the Communities have very often exercised 
their attributed powers by way of legally binding acts, such as Directives and 
Regulations. Eastern enlargement is neither very likely to change this state of 
affairs, nor do we believe it is a preferable option. 
 
In some specific areas of Community policy, not belonging to the ‘core acquis’, 
there may however be some room to depart from the traditional Community 
method of ‘dictating from above’. Areas such as culture or education can be cited 
as examples, as well as the policy areas that have been transferred from pillar three 
to Title IV of the EC Treaty: immigration and asylum policy as well as co-operation 
in civil matters. During the previous period (Maastricht-Amsterdam) decisions on 
these matters were often adopted in the non-binding form of common positions, 
conclusions, et cetera. To a certain extent this policy of convincing instead of 
dictating could be continued in the post-Amsterdam era, although it should be 
added that the recent trend clearly goes in the opposite direction. In their so-called 
Vienna Action Plan the Council and the Commission indicated that the new title IV 
of the EC Treaty should ‘produce’ a significant number of binding acts on the sensi-
tive issues mentioned above. The 1968 Brussels Convention, for example, will be 
‘transformed’ into a legally binding EC Regulation.2 
 
In cases where the EC institutions have decided to adopt legally binding measures 
of general application, they can opt for either a Regulation or a Directive.3 As was 
pointed out above, the important difference between these legal instruments is 
that only Directives need to be transposed into the national laws of the Member 
States. Given this important difference, the EC institutions could more often make 
use of Regulations when legislating in certain policy areas. The cumbersome 
process of adopting the required implementing legislation could thus be avoided. 
 
Whether an intensified use of Regulations will be adopted (after enlargement) 
remains an open question. The current Member States seem to prefer the use of 
Directives, rather than Regulations, precisely because Directives still need further 
implementing legislation at the national level and thus the involvement of national 
governments and (often) parliaments is guaranteed.4 In the Protocol on subsidiar-
ity and proportionality, for example, the preference for (broadly drafted) 
Directives is clearly laid down: “Other things being equal, directives should be 
preferred to regulations and framework directives to detailed measures”.5  
 
An intensified use of Regulations would probably require an amendment of a few 
Treaty provisions: a minority of the current Treaty Articles stipulate that a specific 
legal instrument, for example Directives or Decisions, should be used. Implement-
ing measures on, for example, the mutual recognition of diploma’s or on company 
law still need to be adopted in the form of EC Directives.6 Most of the existing en-
abling provisions, however, use general terms like ‘decisions’ or ‘measures’.7 These 
terms encompass the various types of Community acts listed in Article 249 EC, 
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both the binding ones (Directives, Regulations, Decisions) and the non-binding 
decisions (Opinions, Recommendations).  
 
From the foregoing we conclude that a significant use of Regulations, instead of 
Directives, probably cannot be expected and, moreover, will not offer a satisfactory 
solution for the expected transposition problems by CEEC legislators. There appar-
ently does not exist sufficient political support to adopt ‘genuine’ European laws 
much more often; an amendment of several legal bases would be necessary; and, 
of course, problems relating to the application and supervisory stages would 
remain to exist. 
 
 
7.1.2 A CALCULATED CHOICE OF LEGAL INSTRUMENT UNDER THE OTHER EU PILLARS? 
The question arises whether a ‘calculated’ choice of the legal instrument could 
provide an adequate solution to transposition problems where the Union legislates 
in the areas of CFSP and PJCC. As far as legislation under the second pillar is con-
cerned (CFSP) this issue does not seem to be of great significance: CFSP decisions, by 
their very nature, will hardly ever require implementing national measures of a 
legislative nature. Rather the Member States have to ensure that their foreign 
policies are in conformity with the CFSP instruments, such as joint actions and 
common positions.8 The latter requirement implies that national administrations 
may have to apply and enforce CFSP decisions and, perhaps, the national judiciary 
can supervise the correct application of these second pillar instruments by national 
administrative agencies.9 Action on the part of the legislative authorities, however, 
will often not be necessary. 
 
In criminal matters - the central subject matter of the third EU pillar - there does 
not seem to be much scope for ‘smart’ legal instrument choices either, at least as 
far as the legally binding acts are concerned. Since Amsterdam, the third pillar 
legal instruments are listed in Article 34(2) TEU.10  
 
The common position - the first instrument of the list - should, in general, be 
considered as part of the Union’s soft law as they are used to define ‘the approach 
of the Union to a particular matter’. The non-binding nature of this instrument can 
also be deduced from the fact that the European Parliament does not have to be 
consulted by the Council prior to the adoption of common positions (Article 39 
TEU). Moreover, the Court does not have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on 
the interpretation or validity of common positions (Article 35 TEU). This confirms 
that the drafters of the Amsterdam Treaty did not intend to create a legally binding 
and enforceable EU act.  
 
Of course, these characteristics make the PJCC common position the perfect legal 
instrument to conduct a policy of convincing rather than dictating in the area of 
criminal law matters.11 It however seems that the Council may also adopt other 
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types of non-binding legal instruments. Perhaps in this context in particular, it is 
possible to envisage the formulation at EU level of non-binding model codes of law 
or ‘restatements’. These could bring together in a comprehensible fashion the 
various aspects of a particular subject (for example, the law of criminal procedure) 
gleaned from the ‘best practices’ at the national level. The idea behind such softer 
initiatives is to present a clear alternative to a legislative technique of harmonisa-
tion in areas where it is felt inappropriate (criminal law in general?). This alterna-
tive would aim to ‘learn from’ the various national law systems and to draw up a 
type of restatement of the best practices. Such a code or restatement could have a 
role in assisting CEECs when considering appropriate national legislation from the 
wider perspective of enforcing and applying EU law in general. Moreover, such 
alternative instruments could have a role in reducing harmful divergence between 
Member States and bringing about more convergence in practice as an alternative 
to the route of legislative harmonisation. There are of course downsides to this 
technique but we submit that at the very least it constitutes a route worthy of 
further exploration. Just as the Principles of European Contract Law (the so-called 
Lando Principles) may indeed ultimately form the basis of a European Contract 
Law12 there could be a similar initiative to draw up ‘Principles of Criminal Law’ or 
‘Principles of Police Law’. The initiation, funding and providing of technical assis-
tance to support such a process, could conceivably be entrusted to the Commis-
sion, although it is suggested that the actual task of drawing up the provisions of 
such Principles should involve recognised independent experts in the respective 
fields. 
 
If and when the EU institutions have, however, decided that this soft law approach 
does not offer the best solution in the case concerned, they will have to use one of 
the other legal instruments of Article 34(2) TEU. From the description of the 
characteristics of (PJCC) framework decisions it is clear that this instrument is 
intended to produce legally binding effects and that it should be implemented at 
the national level. Hence, like EC Directives, the PJCC Framework Decisions heavily 
depend on the co-operation of the legislators of the Member States.13  
  
 
The PJCC decision (within the meaning of Article 34(2)(c) TEU) more or less re-
sembles the EC Regulation, as it is stated that such decisions shall be binding, 
presumably ‘in their entirety’. On the other hand, they may not be used for the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States and no mention is made of the 
‘general applicability’ of these decisions. The analogy with the EC regulation is 
therefore probably not as great as it seems at first sight. Finally, the PJCC Con-
ventions (Article 34(2)(d) TEU) cannot be considered as ‘genuine European laws’ 
either. For their entry into force, it is required that Member States shall adopt 
these conventions in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
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All in all, the two non-Community pillars provide for quite different legal instru-
ments and seem to lack a legal instrument along the lines of the EC Regulation. In 
these ‘flanking’ policy areas it appears that the EU institutions can only shape their 
policies in very close co-operation with national legislative authorities (including 
those of the CEECs). The adoption of genuine ‘European laws’ which do not require 
transposition in national legislation does not seem possible. Only as regards the 
choice between soft law and hard law, the non-Community pillars, and in partic-
ular the third pillar, provide the EU institutions with sufficient options.  
 
 
7.2 EU ASSISTANCE TO THE CEECS LEGISLATORS 
The intensified use of Regulations by the EC institutions should be considered as 
only a moderate contribution to the goal of better transposition. The same holds 
true for the adoption of non-binding measures, in particular where the functioning 
of the internal market is concerned. It should therefore be acknowledged that the 
primary responsibility for the correct transposition of (legally binding) EU law re-
mains in the hands of the national legislative authorities, including those in the 
new Member States (government, administrations, and/or the national parlia-
ments, depending on how a Member State decides to implement EU law).  
 
Given this division of responsibilities, the major contribution the Union can make 
in ensuring that the system continues to function effectively would be to provide 
assistance to the CEECs legislatures. Such assistance could take different forms, 
such as monitoring the transposition process, giving legal and economic advice, or 
stimulating the CEEC legislatures to bring (and keep) their laws in line with EU law. 
Of course, already during the current pre-accession period the EU institutions and 
the Member States strongly emphasise this – what might be called – ‘softer’ ap-
proach to the CEECs transposition problems. One of many examples is provided by 
the Union’s effort to make the candidates develop systems for ensuring that draft 
legislation conforms to EU standards. From the various Regular Reports it appears 
that some candidates have already made good progress in this respect. In Latvia, 
for example, the national parliament has taken measures to increase the capacity 
to assess the compatibility of draft legislation with EC law.14 In Slovenia, on the 
other hand, the legislative process continues to be slow: every law requires three 
readings in the national parliament and instabilities within the coalition slow 
down parliamentary decision making.15 
 
Although not really sensational, this ‘softer’ solution of giving assistance to the 
CEECs legislatures may prove to be the only realistic option in the long run. This 
approach clearly acknowledges the primary responsibility of the national legis-
lators to adopt and amend legislative provisions to keep their national laws in line 
with EC law, just as it has always been. The Union can only play a ‘secondary’ role, 
that is, it can offer assistance and monitor the process of transposition in these 
countries. 
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1 See, e.g. the annex to Council decision 1999/857/EC on the principles, 
priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession 
Partnership with the Republic of Bulgaria (OJ 1999 L 335: 48). 
2  See further paragraph 15.4.1. 
3  Leaving aside the so-called sui generis decisions of the EC institutions, which 
sometimes can be considered to be binding acts of general application as well 
(such as the Socrates decision). Decisions within the meaning of Article 249 EC 
are usually used in individual cases. 
4 Cf. T. Koopmans (1995) ‘Regulations, directives, measures’, p. 691 in O. Due, 
M. Lutter, J. Schwarze (Hrsg.), Festschrift für Ulrich Everling Baden-Baden: 
Nomos.  
5 Point 6 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality (OJ 1997 C 340: 105). See also the opinion of the Committee of 
the Regions on ‘better lawmaking’ (OJ 1999 C 374/11). At point 3.4 this 
advisory body “repeats the need to give priority to directives over regulations 
thus enabling Member States and local and regional authorities to choose the 
most appropriate legislative instruments with which to achieve the objectives 
set at European level”. 
6 See Articles 47(1) and 44 EC, respectively. It should be added that an amend-
ment to these Treaty Articles (aiming at expanding the legal instruments at 
the disposal of the institutions) is unnecessary if the EC institutions are 
allowed to fall back on another legal basis which does mention the desired 
legal instrument. In the Massey-Ferguson Case (8/73, [1973] ECR 897) the 
Court, indeed, seemed to accept this construction: Article 235 EEC (now Article 
308 EC) could be used as the legal basis for the Regulation concerned, since 
Article 100 EEC (now Article 94 EC) merely provided for the adoption of 
Directives. 
7 See e.g. Article 95 EC (‘measures’ concerning the internal market), Article 308 
EC (‘appropriate measures’) and the legal bases of the new Title IV (‘measures’ 
on asylum, immigration policy, judicial co-operation in civil matters, etc.). 
8 See Article 14(3) TEU, which stipulates that joint actions shall commit the 
Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity. 
With regard to common positions, Article 15 TEU imposes on Member States 
the obligation to ensure that their national policies conform to these common 
positions. 
9 Something which essentially depends on whether or not these CFSP decisions 
may be invoked before the national courts. On the question of direct effect of 
CFSP decisions, see further paragraph 14.1. In general on the legal status and 
binding force of CFSP decisions, see R.A. Wessel (1999) The European Union’s 
Foreign and Security Policy,Kluwer, Chapter 5. 
10 For a good description of the legal instruments of the revamped third pillar, 
see J. Monar (1998 ) ‘Justice and Home Affairs in the Treaty of Amsterdam: 
Reform at the Price of Fragmentation’, EL Rev. 320. 
11  Cf. the previous paragraph. 
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12 See further, Busch and Hondius (2000) ‘Een nieuw contracten-recht voor 
Europa: de Principles of European Contract Law vanuit Nederlands per-
spectief’, NJB, 837- 848. 
13 See, for example, the Commission’s proposal for a Council Framework Deci-
sion on combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means of payment  
(OJ 1999 C 376 E: 20). With regard to implementation, this draft decision 
contains the usual obligation: “Member States shall bring into force the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this 
Framework Decision […]” (Article 7). 
14 Second Regular Report on Latvia, Chapter B.1. 
15 See the Second Regular Report from the Commission on Progress towards 
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8 PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF PART C 
The formal transposition of EU law into the national legal orders of the new 
Member States is just a first step; the implemented rules should also be applied 
and enforced by national administrative authorities in daily life. As was mentioned 
earlier, both the European Council and the Council of Ministers strongly empha-
sise this requirement. The third part of this report is therefore concerned with the 
problems regarding the application of EU law by national administrative entities. 
First it is stressed that for its enforcement, Community law heavily depends on 
administrative structures and organisations set up at the national level. Only in 
very few cases do the authors of the Treaties choose for a centralised means of 
enforcing substantive EC rules (paragraph 9).  
 
The coming enlargement may, however, require the development of new ways of 
ensuring that Community law (and Union law) is correctly applied and enforced 
within the Member States. A rather far-reaching solution would be to choose for 
some form of centralised enforcement in many areas of Community/Union policy. 
In this respect attention is given to the identity of the central executive organ 
– Commission or independent agencies – and to the scope of its (executive) 
powers (paragraph 10). As, in our view, it must be seriously questioned whether 
this is a realistic option, a second, less radical, solution will be discussed. This 
latter solution takes as its departure point the status quo that the application and 
enforcement of EU law remains in the hands of national administrative authorities 
but ensures that the Community as such strongly backs and supports these admin-
istrations in a manner which would go beyond current realities (paragraph 11).  
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9 THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS: DECENTRALISED 
ENFORCEMENT IS THE RULE 
In almost all areas of Community policy-making the administrative authorities of 
the Member States are responsible for applying and enforcing Community law 
obligations. This responsibility can be deduced from Article 10 (ex 5) of the EC 
Treaty, according to which the Member States shall take all appropriate measures, 
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of 
the EC Treaty or resulting from action taken by the Community institutions. 
Member States should also facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks 
and they are required to abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the 
attainment of the Treaty objectives.1 In important fields of Community activities, 
such as agriculture, it is therefore for the national administrative authorities to 
ensure the day-to-day application and enforcement of the many agricultural 
measures in relation to private individuals. The European Commission may, for 
example, prohibit all imports of Japanese fish for sanitary reasons. It is however a 
task for the national agencies to confiscate illegal imports. Therefore private firms 
will be confronted with civil servants from the national department of agriculture, 
not with Commission’s officials.2 Likewise, the Community’s structural policy is 
essentially applied and enforced in a decentralised way. The considerable amounts 
of money from the Community’s European Social Fund (ESF), for example, are paid 
to the national employment services. It is their task to distribute the financial 
assistance among the various individual beneficiaries.3 
 
Only in few cases does Community law provide for some form of centralised way of 
enforcing substantive rules. The most well-known example is, of course, the power 
of the European Commission to apply and enforce the EC rules on competition 
policy vis-à-vis private companies. The Commission is responsible to ensure com-
pliance with the prohibitions laid down in Article 81 EC (cartels between under-
takings) and Article 82 (abuse by an undertaking of a dominant position within the 
common market). The Commission is also empowered to exempt certain cartels 
from the general prohibition of Article 81(1) EC.4  
 
Although this is the most well-known example, it should be added that a few other 
central agencies have been set up as well to apply EU rules in specific policy areas. 
In the area of intellectual property rights (IPR), for example, the regulation on the 
Community trade mark has established the Office for Harmonisation in the Inter-
nal Market (Trade Marks and Designs).5 Still, most decisions on IPR have taken the 
form of Directives, and are therefore enforced and applied at the national level.6  
 
A few years ago, some suggestions were made of initiating a far-reaching ‘agen-
cification’ of the Commission and its tasks across various policy-making areas; in 
other words, of ‘farming-out’ many of the tasks of the Commission to independent 
agencies which would be given powers over specific policy making areas and, pos-
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sibly enforcement related powers.7 Such proposals for reform were essentially 
inspired by a desire to curtail significantly the role and influence of the Commis-
sion in the current constitutional set-up. They are not logically in line with the 
current situation where a number of ‘independent agencies’ with limited powers 
have been set up in an ad hoc fashion.8 No serious consideration seems to have 
been given to the radical agencification proposals and our view is that such a far-
reaching approach would be very difficult to rhyme with a more constitutional and 
coherent overall approach imbued with more accountability and a stronger system 
of checks and balances than is currently the case. Moreover, even within the con-
straints of the current system there has been a veritable explosion of European 
agencies but this trend has not weakened the role of national administrations but 
rather has resulted in a phenomenon of ‘copinage technique’ between Community 
and national officials.9 
 
From this brief analysis of the current state of affairs it follows that, if things would 
remain the way they are now, the administrative authorities of the CEECs will ac-
quire enormous responsibilities after accession to the Union. They will become 
responsible for the correct application of most of the Community rules within their 
own territory, on matters as diverse as for example the import of bananas from 
third countries,10 driving and rest periods for truck drivers11 or the exchange of 
university students.12  
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1 See, for example, Case 50/76 Amsterdam Bulb [1977] ECR 137, paragraph 32. 
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6 For example the First Trade Mark Directive (earlier mentioned in the context 
of complete harmonisation, see paragraph 4.4). 
7  See in particular the work by F. Vibert, A Constitution for Europe, and 
proposals made by the (sceptic) European Constitutional Group prior to the 
Maastricht IGC.  
8 See, most recently, E. Chiti (2000) ‘The emergence of a Community adminis-
tration: the case of European Agencies’, CML Rev. 309, and references cited 
therein. See also the discussion of the Meroni case in the next paragraph. 
9  See, in particular, Chiti, op.cit. at p.342. 
10 Cf. Regulation 404/93/EEC (OJ 1993 L47, p.1). 
11 Cf. Regulation 3820/95/EEC on the harmonisation of certain social legislation 
relating to road transport and Regulation 3821/85 on recording equipment in 
road transport (OJ 1985 L 370: 1 and 8, as amended). For the actual enforce-
ment of these Regulations by national police forces, see the reports of the 
Commission on the implementation of the Regulations (e.g., COM (95) 713 
final). For a specific case, namely the implementation of the Regulations by 
the Gendarmerie of the port of Antwerp, see Case C-29/95 Pastoors v Belgian 
State [1997] ECR I-285. 
12 From Article 5 of the Socrates decision (819/95/EC, OJ 1995 L87/10) it appears 
that both the Commission and the Member States are responsible for the 
implementation of the Socrates programme. 
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10 CENTRALISATION OF ENFORCEMENT TASKS? 
The most far-reaching solution would be to centralise the application and enforce-
ment of Community law in most areas of EC competence. This would mean that the 
Commission (or some other central enforcement agency) would acquire a central 
role in the application process. An important advantage of this approach would be 
that Union law, and in particular Community law, would become less dependent 
on capacities and qualities of national administrative agencies for its application in 
practice. Just as the undertaking which abuses its dominant position on the Com-
munity market should be afraid of the Commission and less of national competi-
tion authorities, the farmer would be confronted, primarily, with Commission 
officials. Civil servants from the national Ministry of Agriculture would merely 
play a supportive role or no role at all. These examples illustrate that centralised 
application should only be considered an ‘advantage’ - as compared to the current 
system of decentralised application - if one has little faith in the capacity of 
national agencies to apply EC/EU law effectively, in particular vis-à-vis individuals. 
 
It must, however, seriously be questioned whether centralisation to any significant 
extent is a realistic option. The Commission already now lacks the necessary re-
sources to perform all its monitoring tasks properly. More centralisation after en-
largement would only be possible if the Commission were given much more finan-
cial resources and manpower. It is highly uncertain whether the Member States 
(including the new ones) would accept greater enforcement powers by the Com-
mission, as they feel this would be tantamount to a considerable loss of sovereign-
ty. Several recent documents adopted by Member States’ representatives highlight 
the politically sensitive nature of the issue. The Maastricht Conference stressed 
that it must be for each Member State to determine how the provisions of Com-
munity law can best be enforced in the light of its own particular institutions, legal 
system and other circumstances.1 The Essen European Council stated that the 
administrative implementation of EC law shall, in principle, be the responsibility of 
the Member States in accordance with their constitutional arrangements.2 The 
Madrid European Council stressed the need for the candidate countries to adjust 
their administrative structures to ensure the harmonious operation of Community 
policies after accession.3 And at the Amsterdam summit the principle of enforce-
ment of Community law at the national level was, once again, ‘confirmed’ by the 
High Contracting Parties.4  
 
The Commission itself does not seem to be greatly in favour of more centralisation. 
The Opinions and Regular Reports, stressing the need to reinforce the administra-
tive capacity of the candidates would be quite irrelevant if, after enlargement, EU 
law was to be enforced in a centralised way. More specifically, in the field of com-
petition policy, until now the most important example of enforcement at Com-
munity level, the Commission encourages decentralisation of the application and 
enforcement of the competition rules. The main reason being that “it is incon-
ceivable that, in an enlarged European Union, undertakings should have to notify, 
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and the Commission examine, thousands of restrictive practices”.5 Such decen-
tralisation in the field of competition policy would make national administrative 
agencies competent to decide on restrictive practices with cross-border effects, and 
would therefore “dramatically change the present system of enforcement of Com-
munity competition law”.6 Moreover, rather than ever more powers being con-
ceded to the centre (i.e. the Commission), the trend in the field of competition law 
is one of significantly accrued contacts among competent national authorities 
themselves. This will go so far in the future as to link all the national administra-
tive agencies by means of a network with a common database.  
 
Regarding the exercise of administrative functions by independent agencies (other 
than the Commission), the Meroni case of the Court may in any event be regarded 
as defining fairly precise and narrow parameters.7 In this case the Court ruled that 
it is not allowed to delegate discretionary powers, implying a wide margin of dis-
cretion, to bodies other than those which the Treaty has established. Otherwise the 
“balance of powers which is characteristic of the institutional structure of the Com-
munity” would be negatively affected. On the other hand, the delegation of “clearly 
defined executive powers” to such bodies/agencies is in the Court’s view accept-
able, as a delegation of this kind would not render the guarantee of institutional 
balance ineffective.  
 
It therefore seems to follow that the Meroni case constitutes another obstacle to 
any ‘genuine’ agencification, as discussed in the previous paragraph. Only the 
creation of agencies with a strict mandate – such as, presumably, the Office for 
Harmonisation in the Internal Market – seems possible under the Meroni criteria. 
Another way to avoid ‘Meroni objections’ is to establish bodies without any real 
power of decision-making but whose primary purpose is, for example, the gather-
ing of information. A Community organ such as the Monitoring Centre for Racism 
and Xenophobia (in Vienna) therefore would not seem to fall under the type of 
agencies the Court had in mind in Meroni.8 Finally, the drafters of the Treaty may 
decide to insert a clear Treaty provision on a certain EC or EU agency/organ. In 
that event the Court will probably not object, as the institutional balance was 
modified by the ‘Masters of the Treaties’ themselves. The constitutional position of 
a body such as Europol is therefore unproblematic, at least in relation to the 
Court’s Meroni case, since this EU organ was given an explicit Treaty base by the 
Maastricht Treaty. 
 
Finally, it should be noticed that centralisation of enforcement tasks would have 
important consequences for the system of judicial protection: the supervisory tasks 
of the national judiciary would be transferred to the EU Courts in Luxembourg. 
This not unimportant consequence will be discussed later, in the framework of 
supervision by judicial organs.9 
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9 See Part D, paragraph 14.3. 

ANOTHER POINT OF DEPARTURE 
65
11 ANOTHER POINT OF DEPARTURE: APPLICATION OF 
EU LAW BY NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS 
Since the Community is already moving away from centralised application and 
enforcement of EC law, it may be more appropriate to acknowledge that also in an 
enlarged Union, most rules originating from the EC/EU will have to be applied and 
enforced by national administrative authorities. It is not purported to deprive 
national administrations of their enforcement tasks; rather the point of departure 
is to assist these agencies in the tasks assigned to them post-accession. As the 
problems regarding (sectoral and horizontal) administrative capacities in the can-
didate countries are extensively discussed in a report by Verheijen1, we will merely 
make some remarks from the perspective of the European Union system itself.  
 
Starting from the premise that decentralised enforcement is inevitable, the Union 
could adopt specific rules – in secondary legislation – on how the national admini-
strations should apply EC law. This would include specific EC rules on the sanctions 
which could be imposed on individuals by national administrations. This method 
has already been followed in the past, notably in the area of agricultural policy and 
the functioning of the internal market. Regarding agriculture, acts of the Council 
(based on Article 37 EC) and acts of the Commission (adopted in the exercise of its 
executive functions) often contain provisions as to the sanctions which national 
administrations should impose in the event that individuals breach the relevant 
substantive EC rules. The Court has clearly approved this practice by stating that 
the competence to adopt rules on sanctions is a corollary of the power to adopt 
substantive (agricultural) rules.2 
 
Given the fact that decentralised application and enforcement will in all likelihood 
remain at the core of the Union’s legal system, the second point to be stressed is 
that the Union can CEEC administrations. The Union, as well as its current Member 
States, would in this approach assist the new members in developing institutions, 
human resources and management skills for effectively implementing and apply-
ing the acquis to the same standards as the fifteen ‘old’ members. Numerous such 
‘coaching’ initiatives to assist the new Member States have already been under-
taken in the framework of the pre-accession strategy, in particular the bringing 
together of administrative agents from the current and the candidate countries 
(the so-called process of ‘twinning’). One of many examples of such twinning 
activities is the project on strengthening institutional capacity in the Latvian en-
vironmental sector in order to enable Latvia to implement and enforce EU environ-
mental legislation in areas such as water and waste.3 Community financial assis-
tance for these (and other) projects is given through the three pre-accession in-
struments Phare, ISPA and Sapard.4 The funding under the Phare programme 
(now) focuses on the main priorities for the adoption of the acquis, i.e. building up 
the administrative and institutional capacities of the applicant states.5 
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After enlargement, these support activities will have to go on for a long period of 
time. Accession implies that the new members can participate in (even) more in-
centive measures provided by the EU. With regard to the establishment of an ‘area 
of freedom, security and justice’, for example, the EU institutions have adopted 
several programmes aimed at enhancing the effective application, at the national 
level, of the relevant Treaty provisions (Title IV EC and Title VI TEU) and the sub-
sequent Council decisions. The OISIN programme, for instance, offers a framework 
to develop and enhance co-operation between police, custom and other law 
enforcement authorities of the Member States, notably by providing such authort-
ies with a greater insight into the working methods of their counterparts.6 The Fal-
cone programme is specifically concerned with the combat of organised crime; this 
programme provides for exchanges, training and co-operation for the persons res-
ponsible in the action against organised crime.7 The STOP programme contains an 
exchange programme for persons responsible for combating trade in human 
beings and sexual exploitation of children.8 The Odysseus programme established 
a framework for training, information, study and exchange activities in the areas of 
asylum and immigration policy.9 The general objective of this programme is to 
extend and strengthen existing co-operation between the administrations of the 
Member States in the matter of asylum, immigration, the crossing of external 
borders and the security of identity documents.  
 
Effective implementation also requires the establishment of structures for evalu-
ating the application and enforcement of the acquis of the Union in the various 
(new) Member States. The existing decision on collective evaluation of the im-
plementation of the acquis in the area of Justice and Home Affairs could be taken 
as an example.10 In any event, this overview of ‘coaching’ programmes in a specific 
field of EC/EU policy clearly illustrates that decentralised application and enforce-
ment of the law is (still) very much the rule. 
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12 PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF PART D 
Montesquieu already foresaw that an independent judicial authority within the 
national state system might be necessary to supervise the application of legal 
provisions by, in particular, the administration. Taking up this idea, the original 
Treaty of Rome provided for certain supervisory mechanisms where independent 
judicial organs play a central role. As far as EC law is concerned, both the national 
courts and the Courts in Luxembourg (Court of Justice, Court of First Instance) 
perform these supervisory roles. 
 
From the viewpoint of individuals (citizens and private undertakings) the national 
judiciary plays a pivotal role in safeguarding their Community law rights. This 
stems from the fact that in most areas of Community policy the legal rules are ap-
plied and enforced by administrative authorities at the national level. As a conse-
quence, disputes will usually arise between individuals and the authorities of a 
Member State. In this situation individuals do not have direct access to the Courts 
in Luxembourg; they will have to initiate proceedings before the competent na-
tional judge. Most disputes in the field of migration law, for example, and all so-
called Francovich actions (state liability for breaches of Community law) belong to 
this category of vertical disputes (individual versus Member State). Apart from 
these vertical conflicts, the national judiciary is also competent to hear and deter-
mine cases between individuals. In these horizontal disputes questions of Com-
munity law may arise as well, in particular in the fields of labour law, company law 
and consumer law.  
 
With regard to the situations where Community law is supervised by the national 
judiciary (vertical and horizontal disputes) a distinction is made between three 
relevant stages.  
 
First, the influence of EC law on national procedural law is examined. In principle, 
the organisation and operation of the national courts is a matter for the Member 
States to regulate. This so-called principle of national procedural autonomy means 
that it is for the Member States to adopt specific procedural rules on time limits, 
the division of jurisdiction between various national courts, whether or not a right 
of appeal should exist, etc. (paragraph 13).  
 
As the second relevant phase we designate the stage when the national (CEEC) 
judge is at work. During this stage the central issue is the supervision (and hence 
the application) of legal rules emanating from the Union, sometimes on the na-
tional court’s own motion, but usually at the request of parties involved in the legal 
proceedings before it. During this stage the national courts may be confronted 
with all kinds of substantive Community law provisions and with fundamental 
principles of Community law. In order to illustrate the heavy responsibilities and 
necessary attitude changes for the CEEC judiciary, the consequences of the prin-
ciples of supremacy and direct effect for these judges will be examined. These fun-
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damental Community law principles are scrutinised since they apply across the 
broad spectrum of EC policies. In all areas of EC policy (transport, internal market, 
agriculture etc.) the CEEC judiciary will have to take them into account (paragraph 
14). 
 
During the course of proceedings before the national court, it may appear that it 
cannot handle final judgment without having solved a question of EC law. For this 
situation, Community law has always offered the national court the possibility to 
request the Court of Justice for assistance. Through preliminary questions it may 
obtain a ruling of the Court on the interpretation or validity of Community law 
(and, since Amsterdam, of certain parts of Union law). The third relevant stage 
therefore relates to the dialogue between the national court and the EC Court of 
Justice (paragraph 15).  
 
Supervisory tasks have also been attributed directly to the Court of Justice and the 
Court of First Instance. They shall ensure that in the interpretation and applica-
tion of the EC Treaty the law is observed (Article 220 EC). In order to perform this 
task properly, the Courts have been given quite extensive competences to settle 
disputes in so-called direct actions. It is, however, not the purpose of this report to 
analyse the EU system of direct remedies (let alone the system of judicial protec-
tion in its entirety). As we are merely concerned with incorporation problems at 
the national level, the focus is in particular on the pivotal infringement procedure 
of Articles 226-228 EC (paragraph 16).  
 
Finally, as was already mentioned in the introduction to the study, one important 
example of administrative EU principles, including human rights, it is up to the 
Council (and not the Court) to impose certain sanctions on the Member State 
concerned (paragraph 17). 
 
The structure we thus have adopted for this part of the report is designed to shed 
some light in particular on possible reforms of the system of judicial supervision.  
A number of ideas and proposals on this issue have been put forward in recent 
years and months. Some of these ideas essentially aim to alter fundamentally the 
existing structures, other proposals follow a more balanced approach. 
 
Most of the ideas of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance them-
selves, as formulated in their paper ‘The Future of the Judicial System of the 
European Union’ (January 2000) and subsequently in their ‘Contribution to the 
Intergovernmental Conference’ (March 2000), fall within the category of 
‘restrictive’ proposals. Other contributions acknowledge that enlargement de-
mands a reduction of the Court’s workload through institutional reform, but at the 
same time they stress that such reform should not jeopardise effective judicial 
protection.  
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Such a balanced approach can be found in, for example, the Commission’s Opinion 
on institutional reforms.1 The Commission highlights the serious problems relat-
ing to the caseload of the Court; on the other hand it emphasises that effective 
judicial review should be secured, quality and consistency in judicial practice 
should be maintained, and it should be guaranteed that EU law is complied with 
throughout the Union.2 The Due Report may also be rated among the more 
balanced and constructive approaches, as will become clear in this part of this 
study.3  
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1 See the Commission’s Opinion of 26 January 2000 on the next IGC (Adapting 
the Institutions to make a success of enlargement). 
2 See p. 16 of the Commission’s Opinion. 
3 Report by the Working Party on the Future of the European Communities’ 
Court System, January 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the Due Report). 
Although this report was prepared for the European Commission, it should be 
taken as only expressing the Working Party’s views. 
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13 EC LAW AND NATIONAL PROCEDURAL LAW 
13.1 THE PRINCIPLE OF PROCEDURAL AUTONOMY  
The Court has consistently held that it is for the Member States to ensure the legal 
protection which individuals derive from the direct effect of Community law. This 
means that it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate 
the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedur-
al rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from 
directly effective Community law provisions.1 It is therefore in principle a matter 
for the Member States to lay down in their national laws the procedural rules 
governing the manner in which individuals will actually be able to enforce their 
Community law rights. Such procedural rules include rules relating to time limits 
for bringing actions before the national judge, rules on what kind of court is 
competent to hear and determine the proceedings (local, regional, specialised 
court), rules on the right of appeal, et cetera.2  
 
The principle of procedural autonomy often has the effect of causing differences 
among the various Member States in the actual level of judicial protection pro-
vided for individuals. The protection of one and the same substantive Community 
law right may vary from state to state, due to differences in the procedural laws of 
the Member States.3 For example, although individuals in all Member States are 
entitled to recover sums levied by a Member State in breach of substantive EC law 
provisions, divergent national rules on time limits for bringing actions before the 
competent national court may prevent individuals in a few Member States from 
actually getting their money back.4 Likewise, whether or not individuals enjoy the 
right to appeal judgments of (national) courts of first instance is determined by 
national procedural rules.  
 
This principle of national procedural autonomy has, however, been mitigated by 
the Court of Justice and the Community legislator. They have restricted the 
freedom of the Member States to adopt and amend procedural rules on the 
operation of their own judiciary in various ways. 
  
 
13.1.1 LIMITATIONS IN THE COURT’S CASE LAW 
The Court of Justice has restricted the freedom of the Member States in this area 
by stating that procedural rules governing actions for enforcing Community law 
rights must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions 
(the principle of non-discrimination or assimilation). Moreover, such procedural 
rules must not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of 
rights conferred on individuals by Community law (the principle of effectiveness).5 
The latter requirement – among lawyers known as the second Rewe condition – 
has in particular been further teased out by the Court in a number of cases. In the 
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Heylens case the Court ruled that access to a national court should exist in any 
event, at least where this is indispensable for individuals to protect their EC rights 
(in casu rights related to free movement of workers).6 This right of access to justice 
can be considered as an elaboration of the second Rewe criterion, as no access to a 
judicial organ surely makes it ‘virtually impossible’ and ‘excessively difficult’ to 
exercise Community law rights. The judgment in the Heylens case also seems to 
embrace the right of individuals to have access to a judicial body which is 
completely independent from the government and the administration.  
 
More recent case law strongly emphasises that judicial remedies at the national 
level should really be effective. In the Factortame case, for example, concerning 
the compatibility of national legislation with Community law on the right of 
establishment, the Court held that national courts had to be able to grant interim 
relief and to suspend the application of the disputed national legislation until such 
time as the Court could deliver its judgment.7 Similar interim legal protection 
should be offered to individuals who contest the validity of secondary Community 
law (such as directives, regulations and decisions) before national courts.8 
 
Another very far-reaching example is the Emmott case. The Court ruled that a 
Member State may not rely on a limitation period under national law as long as a 
Directive, in breach of which certain charges have been wrongly levied, has not 
been properly transposed into national law.9 Probably because this statement was 
a bit too radical, in subsequent cases the Court returned to its ‘second generation’ 
case law and stated that the Emmott solution was merely justified “by the partic-
ular circumstances of that case”.10  
 
 
13.1.2 LEGISLATIVE LIMITATIONS 
In the second place, a number of Community decisions have limited the discretion 
of the Member States to lay down procedural rules for the judicial enforcement of 
EC law. A relatively modest step has been to lay down explicit provisions on the in-
dividual’s right of access to an independent judicial organ for the purpose of en-
forcing the substantive provisions of the act in question. An example can be found 
in the Second Directive on equal treatment for men and women. This Directive 
requires Member States to ensure a right to judicial protection for persons who 
consider themselves wronged by failure to apply to them the principle of equal 
treatment; they must have the right to pursue their claims “by judicial process 
after possible recourse to other competent authorities”.11 
 
Another well-known example is the Directive on review procedures to the award of 
public supply and public works contracts. This act obliges the Member States, inter 
alia, to guarantee that measures taken by review bodies can be the subject of judi-
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cial review by another body which is a court within the meaning of Article 234 EC 
and which is independent of both the contracting authority and the review body.12 
 
Some other Community acts go a step further by laying down specific require-
ments regarding the proceedings before the national courts. An example is the 
Directive on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex. It obliges 
Member States to take measures to ensure that, when the employee has establish-
ed facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect dis-
crimination, the national court must order the employer to prove that there has 
been no breach of the principle of equal treatment.13  
 
 
13.2 CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ORGANISATION AND OPERATION OF THE 
CEEC JUDICIARY 
Despite these jurisprudential and legislative limitations, it is clear that Member 
States are still left with a considerable margin of discretion regarding the way in 
which they organise their own judicial system. This freedom relates both to the 
‘hardware’ aspects (the institutional set-up of the national judiciary) and to the 
‘software’ aspects (the way in which the national courts should work; rules of pro-
cedure, time limits, division of competences, et cetera). To a very large extent it 
will therefore be for the CEECs themselves to organise their own judicial systems. 
For example, whether disputes in the field of labour law are to be dealt with by the 
ordinary courts of first instance or by specialised labour courts is a matter for the 
CEEC legislative authorities to decide. The same goes for the important issue of con-
stitutional review. It is for the national laws of the CEECs to determine whether 
(supreme) courts have to power to declare statutory laws invalid for breach of the 
national constitution. 
 
Community law does not interfere with these issues as it merely requires the CEEC 
legislator not to adopt discriminatory procedural rules (first Rewe condition), nor 
to adopt rules which make it (almost) impossible for individuals to enforce their 
substantive EC rights (second Rewe condition). Seen from the perspective of the 
EU, most of the recent reforms of the judicial infrastructure in the CEECs14, there-
fore fall within the competence of these states.  
 
Nevertheless, the existing case law of the Court, and in particular the second Rewe 
requirement, may have an important impact on some of these new members. As 
was outlined above, the requirement that it should not be too difficult to enforce EC 
law rights includes the right of access to a national court which is completely in-
dependent from the administration. Although most Eastern European countries 
have (recently) guaranteed this independence,15 this case law would cause serious 
problems for Slovakia, for example, as the judges in this candidate country are still 
far from independent, due to an initial four-year probation period and excessive 
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13.3 REFORMS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL 
PROTECTION IN THE MEMBER STATES 
As the previous paragraph showed, the supervision of Community law by national 
courts heavily relies on procedural rules adopted by the Member States. If we 
assume that in the new Member States these judicial structures for enforcing Com-
munity law rights will not be optimal for many years to come, it may be necessary 
to put less emphasis on the principle of procedural autonomy but, instead, to 
further develop the two minimum requirements, in particular the principle of 
effectiveness. This could happen in the following manner.  
 
In the first place the Court of Justice could become even more ‘active’ than it is 
already today, in particular by interpreting the requirement that national proce-
dural rules must not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise 
of Community law rights conferred on individuals in a stricter fashion. The Court 
could, for example, return to its earlier Emmott way of thinking and hence reject 
the ‘softer’ approach in Steenhorst-Neerings after all. 
 
In the second place the Community legislator could become more active in this 
respect. As was outlined above, only a few legal instruments actually contain 
detailed rules as to how EC law must be enforced before the national judiciary. 
Most decisions of the institutions, however, only prescribe in very general terms 
that Member States should implement and enforce the provisions of the act in 
question. Such general statements do not always include the (explicit) possibility 
that individuals must have access to an independent judicial organ. For example, 
the Directive on restrictions on free movement of workers for reasons of public 
policy, public security or public health does not require the Member State to pro-
vide a right of appeal to a court of law.17 Thus, decisions on matters such as the 
refusal to renew a residence permit or the expulsion of EC workers from the terri-
tory of a Member State, may be taken by administrative authorities, without a 
possibility of review by an independent judicial body. This example clearly illus-
trates that not only the Court but also the Community legislator can further con-
tribute to the strengthening of legal protection of individuals before national 
courts.18 
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14 THE NATIONAL COURT AT WORK: SUPERVISION AND 
APPLICATION OF EU LAW 
After accession the CEEC courts will have to supervise, and therefore interpret and 
apply, numerous EC law provisions. Just as their colleagues in the old Member 
States, they will become the ‘first aid’ juges de droit communautaire. By the time 
accession actually takes place this traditional role of the national judiciary may 
even have been codified in the text of the EC Treaty.1  
 
The purpose of this section of our report is to highlight the responsibilities and 
requisite changes in mentality incumbent on the CEEC judiciary by discussing the 
consequences of the principles of supremacy and direct effect. As was mentioned 
earlier, these fundamental Community law principles are scrutinised because they 
apply across the broad spectrum of EC policies. 
 
 
14.1 DIRECT EFFECT AND SUPREMACY OF EC LAW 
As was pointed out above, the Court has ruled that all provisions of Community 
law (primary and secondary EC law) take precedence over all provisions of national 
law (adopted before or after the relevant Community provision came into force).2 
To the national courts and private individuals this principle of supremacy is, 
however, only of practical importance if a provision of EC law has direct effect, 
meaning that it is suitable to be invoked directly by individuals before the national 
courts. In its case law the Court held that EC law provisions which are uncondition-
al and sufficiently precise, and which do not require further implementation by EC 
institutions or by the Member States, may indeed be invoked before the national 
court.3  
 
The question of direct effect becomes important each time the provisions of Com-
munity law are more favourable to individuals than the relevant provisions of na-
tional law. In that event, a directly effective EC provision confer on individuals 
rights which they can enforce in the courts of a Member State and which that na-
tional court must protect. The consequences of the principles of direct effect and 
supremacy for the national courts were clearly laid down by the Court of Justice in 
its Simmenthal judgment: “Every national court must, in a case within its juris-
diction apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter 
confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law 
which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule”.4 
Thus, the question of direct effect is essentially unrelated to the regime laid down 
in the Member States’ constitution. Even where the constitutions provides for a so-
called dualist regime, it should adopt a monist view as far as the incorporation of 
Community law is concerned. 
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In the course of time the Court ruled that numerous provisions of EC law do indeed 
entail direct effect. It all started with the E(E)C Treaty provisions. The Court ac-
knowledged the direct effect of the Treaty Articles on customs duties on imports, 
the freedom to provide services, the freedom of establishment and the free move-
ment of workers.5 Some of the Treaty provisions may be invoked vis-à-vis indi-
viduals as well.6 
 
More recently, the focus is on directly effective provisions in secondary Commu-
nity law. Notably the direct effect of EC Directives has been the subject of con-
siderable attention. Though Directives should be addressed to Member States 
(Article 249 EC), the Court ruled that Directives may confer rights on individuals 
which they can enforce before the national courts. The provisions of Directives, as 
far as their subject matter is concerned, should be unconditional and sufficiently 
precise and the period for their implementation should have expired. If these con-
ditions are met, individuals may invoke Directives vis-à-vis Member State author-
ities (but not against other natural or legal persons).7  
 
Other interesting nuances have emerged in the field of the EC’s external relations. 
It appears that international agreements to which the Community is a party con-
tain quite a lot of directly effective provisions. The Co-operation Agreement 
between the EEC (and its Member States) and Morocco, for example, contains a 
national treatment clause in the field of social security which may be invoked by 
Moroccan workers before the Member States’ judges.8 The Court’s case law on the 
direct effect of the Turkish Association Agreement (and decisions of the EEC-
Turkey Association Council) is another example of how the Court ensures that 
individuals (in casu Turkish workers and their families) can effectively ensure 
their own judicial protection.9 
 
With regard to the direct effect of second and third pillar law (i.e. the provisions of 
Titles V and VI of the TEU as well as secondary acts adopted on the basis of these 
Titles) the matter is somewhat more complicated. As the Court does not have juris-
diction in second pillar issues, the question whether or not a CFSP provision has 
direct effect probably will have to be answered on the basis of national (consti-
tutional) rules relating to the incorporation of international law into the domestic 
legal order. This would mean that in Member States with a dualist system, CFSP 
decisions could never be invoked directly by individuals before national courts.  
In monist countries (such as, for example, the Netherlands) this is different on the 
basis of national (constitutional) law.10 The issue of direct effect of CFSP decisions 
does not, however, seem to be of great importance to the national judiciary. CFSP 
decisions usually deal with the external relations of the Union (its foreign policy 
vis-à-vis third countries) and therefore CFSP decisions will not be ‘unconditional 
and sufficiently precise’ for individuals to rely on before the national courts. Very 
often such foreign policy decisions are not intended to govern the position of indi-
viduals in their relationships with other individuals or with Member States. 11 
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Third pillar decisions are of much more direct relevance to individuals as they 
have to deal with criminal law matters. Such PJCC measures may contain clear and 
unconditional provisions which are capable of being invoked by private parties 
before the national courts. Unfortunately there is a small problem: the Amsterdam 
Treaty explicitly laid down that the most important PJCC instruments (framework 
decisions and decisions) “shall not entail direct effect”.12 National judges are there-
fore explicitly forbidden from applying these third pillar measures in favour of in-
dividuals, even if a PJCC (framework) decision would entail clear and precise 
obligations for the Member States.  
 
 
14.2 CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF DIRECT EFFECT AND 
SUPREMACY FOR THE CEEC JUDICIARY 
The case law of the EU Court on supremacy and direct effect will probably have 
very drastic consequences for the judges in the CEECs. Under the communist 
regimes, the constitution of most of these countries provided for a dualist regime 
so that these judges were forbidden from giving precedence to provisions of 
international law over conflicting provisions of their national laws. As a result, it 
has been impossible for individuals to rely directly, before the CEEC courts, on 
provisions of international law.13 
 
Upon accession, things will have to change considerably, as least as far as Com-
munity law is concerned. In case of a conflict between EC law and national law, the 
CEEC judge should give preference to Community law, regardless of what its own 
constitution says on the relationship between international law (including EU law) 
and national law (monist or dualist system).14 Hence, even where there still exists 
a dualist regime at the national level, the CEEC court should side aside any conflict-
ing national provision on its own motion, provided that the EC provision invoked 
by the individual entails direct effect.15 Moreover, the latter question – whether or 
not a provision of EC law has direct effect – is to be answered, in the final instance, 
by the Court and Justice and not by the CEEC judge itself.16  
 
For example, in the CEECs many discriminatory provisions in the field of taxation 
still exist.17 If these legislative provisions are not amended upon accession, it is 
very likely that individuals will invoke the Treaty prohibition on discrimination in 
this area (contained in Article 90 EC). According to the Court, this Treaty provision 
entails direct effect,18 which means that the discriminatory provisions in the legis-
lation of the CEECs may not be applied by the CEEC judiciary. As a result, the appli-
cation of such provisions by the administrative authorities (the tax authorities in 
particular) would become meaningless, as other individuals would also seek legal 
protection in the national courts. 
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Another Treaty provision which will probably have very serious consequences for 
the new Member States is Article 141 (ex 119) EC on equal pay for men and women. 
According to this provision each Member State shall ensure that the principle of 
equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value is ap-
plied. Despite the fact that this Treaty provision merely speaks of a ‘principle’, the 
Court ruled that individuals may invoke the prohibition of discrimination with 
regard to pay directly before the national courts vis-à-vis the Member States. 
Moreover, this Treaty provision may also be invoked against other individuals 
(private employers), although Article 141 (ex 119) EC is merely addressed to ‘each 
Member State’.19 
 
This (not uncontroversial) case law of the Court means that the national judges in 
the CEECs are refrained from applying discriminatory provisions relating to the 
payment of male and female workers, whether contained in national legislative 
provisions or in arrangements of a civil nature. Moreover, the principle of equal 
treatment of male and female workers was worked out in a series of EC Directives. 
The prohibitions contained in these secondary acts (relating to vocational training, 
et cetera) may be invoked by individuals before the national courts as well, at least 
against Member State authorities.20 A striking example is the recent Kreil case, 
where the Court ruled that a general exclusion of women from the military services 




14.3 POSSIBLE CHANGES: TAKING AWAY SUPERVISORY TASKS FROM 
THE NATIONAL JUDICIARY? 
From the various Regular Reports it cannot be deduced that the public in the CEECs 
enjoys great confidence in the quality of the national judiciary. In Romania, for 
example, many complaints from individuals relate to problems with the judiciary 
and not the administration. Individuals therefore rather lodge complaints with the 
national Ombudsman, which is “seen more as an alternative Supreme Court rather 
than an Ombudsman”.22 After accession, a lack of confidence in the judiciary is 
even more unacceptable, as all courts will be responsible for correctly applying the 
entire acquis communautaire. This inevitably requires the trust and confidence of 
the public in the quality of the national courts. 
 
If we assume that the situation will not improve considerably for the years to 
come, a radical solution might be envisaged: should the Union not take away much 
of the supervisory responsibilities from the national courts, and put them in the 
hands of the EU Courts instead? This objective arguably could be achieved by cen-
tralising the application of EU law, that is, by giving the power to apply EC law to a 
central administrative entity (notably the European Commission). If the European 
Commission were to apply Community law vis-à-vis individuals much more often, 
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this would automatically make the Courts in Luxembourg competent to decide on 
their disputes. Individuals could no longer lodge their complaint with the national 
courts, as these complaints would be addressed to a European institution. They 
would have to make use of direct legal actions, in particular the action for 
annulment of decisions of the Commission (Article 230 EC). 
 
In areas where Community law is already applied by a central institution, we see, 
indeed, that it is for a central court (the Court of First Instance) to supervise the 
actions of that institution, and not for the national courts. Complaints of individ-
ual firms against Commission decisions in the field of competition policy are 
lodged with the Court of First Instance, as is the case with appeals against deci-
sions of the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market.23 Thus, as was al-
ready briefly mentioned earlier, a centralisation of application of Community law 
will also have important consequences for the judicial protection of individuals. 
The Polish firm would no longer be able to lodge its complaints with the regional 
court at Warsaw, but would be required to travel the long road to Luxembourg in 
order to sue the Commission there.  
 
This is, in our view, an important reason for considering carefully whether central-
isation of supervisory tasks is really a desirable option. An even more important 
reason is that the workload of the Court would increase to an unbearable extent, 




14.4 THE ‘RESPECTFUL’ APPROACH: EU ASSISTANCE TO THE JUDICIARY 
OF THE CEECS 
It is thus highly unlikely that the central role for the judiciary in the new Member 
States in supervising the correct application of EU law can be avoided. The only re-
maining solution is probably to further improve – what is usually termed – the 
‘capacity’ of the judiciary in the new Member States to deal with EU law. Although 
this means, once again, that the Union can only play a supportive role, the im-
portance of it should not be underestimated.  
 
The training of the judges in EU law should be considered as one of the most im-
portant means to improve this judicial quality; by making these judges more 
familiar with EU law, the chances of EU law being correctly applied by the courts 
and tribunals in the CEECs increase. Indeed, this is neither a radical solution nor a 
completely novel one, but probably the ‘respectful’ approach of offering assistance 
to these courts is the only reasonable solution open to the Union. After all, Com-
munity law has always heavily relied on the quality of the national judiciary. The 
next enlargement round will not bring about radical changes, for the simple reason 
that the Courts in Luxembourg do not have the capacity to handle all cases be-
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tween individual parties (horizontal) and all cases between individuals and 
Member States (vertical). Moreover, it is rather improbable that the two Com-
munity Courts themselves would support the acquisition of such new tasks, having 
regard for the ideas set out in their two reports (referred to in paragraph 12). 
 
The option discussed here boils down to a continuation of the efforts which have 
already been undertaken to improve the CEEC judges’ knowledge and understand-
ing of EU law by offering financial assistance, training, et cetera. Currently such 
assistance is provided mainly under the Phare programme; once the CEECs have 
become a member of the Union, several other financial support programmes will 
be open to them. Programmes which specifically are directed towards the legal 
professions are the Robert Schumann-programme24 and the Grotius-program-
me.25 The EU institutions probably do not possess the competence to prescribe 
such courses as a matter of obligation for national judges, nor to prescribe the 
exact content of such courses, since the Community must ‘fully respect’ the res-
ponsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organisation 
of education systems.26  
 
It is thus left to the discretion of the (new) Member States whether courses in 
European law are obligatory or not, and what their exact content should be. Using 
this discretion, some of the CEECs have decided that candidates applying for the 
office of judge must qualify in the field of EU law (Lithuania, for example); in other 




14.5 ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPERVISORY FUNCTIONS OF THE CEEC 
JUDICIARY IN AN ENLARGED UNION 
From the preceding paragraphs it appears that soon after accession the judiciary in 
the CEECs will have to assume full responsibility for supervising the application of 
numerous provisions and principles of both primary and secondary Community 
and Union law. In exercising these supervisory functions, the CEEC judges will, of 
course, have to interpret and apply the relevant EC provisions. Though they will be 
entitled to ask the EU Court for assistance (see the next paragraph), they must also 
be able to identify questions of EU law on their own, in particular during the initial 
stages of the cases brought before them. The ‘horizontal’ principles of direct effect 
and supremacy have been discussed in order to illustrate that the judiciary carries 
a special responsibility to ensure that EC rights for individual are actually enforced. 
 
As there are some doubts as to whether the CEEC judges are really equipped to per-
form this new task, one could imagine that important parts of the jurisdiction of 
these courts would be transferred to the central level (Court of Justice, Court of 
First Instance). This does not seem on closer examination a very realistic option 
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nor indeed a desirable one. A major objection is that individuals are more familiar 
with the national judicial system than with the judicial organs and proceedings in 
Luxembourg. A more practical objection is that substantive centralisation of 
supervisory tasks would further increase the already gigantic workload of the 
Luxembourg courts. The best solution therefore in our view consists in the con-
tinuation of the process of ‘backing up’ the courts and tribunals in Eastern Europe. 
After enlargement as well, the Union should continue its efforts aimed  
at judicial ‘institution building’. The supporting measures mentioned above 
(Schumann, Grotius) constitute important means of achieving this goal.  
 
It is certain that significant positive effects will only be produced in the longer 
term. The first years after accession will see numerous problems in the supervision 
of European law by the judiciary in the new Member States. It is, for example, 
rather unlikely that the extremely complex EC rules on intellectual property rights 
will be applied correctly by all judicial bodies in the ten (or more) new members.28 
After all, having lived so many years under a communist regime these judges are 
not really familiar with concepts such as trade marks, brands and copy rights. In 
this respect it must be said that, although the supervision by the CEEC judiciary will 
certainly not be perfect, one should also place faith in the ability of these judges to 
adapt themselves to their new legal surroundings. A lack of knowledge and under-
standing of EU law is not an entirely new phenomenon. Even the Dutch judiciary is 
at times ‘accused’ of insufficiently taking Community law into account, despite the 
fact that the Netherlands is one of the founding fathers of the Union.29 
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(OJ 1994 L 11: 1). On 8 July 1999, the CFI delivered its first judgment under this 
new jurisdiction in the Baby-dry case. See Case T-163/98 The Procter & 
Gamble Company v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade 
Marks and Designs). 
24 Decision 1496/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of  
22 June 1998 establishing an action programme to improve awareness of 
Community law within the legal professions (Robert Schumann project)  
(OJ 1998 L 196: 24). 
25 Joint Action 96/636/JHA of 28 October 1996 adopted by the Council on the 
basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on a programme of 
incentives and exchanges for legal practitioners (OJ 1996 L 287: 3). This 
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programme was established in order to foster mutual knowledge of legal and 
judicial systems and to facilitate judicial co-operation between Member States. 
This programme comprises training, exchange and work-experience program-
mes, organisation of meetings, studies and research, and distribution of infor-
mation. 
26 See Article 149 (ex 126) EC. Cf. J. Shaw (1999) ‘From the Margins to the 
Centre: Education and Training Law and Policy’, p. 555 in P. Craig and 
G. de Búrca The Evolution of EU Law,Oxford; K. Lenaerts (1994) ‘Education in 
European Community Law after Maastricht’, CMLRev. 7. 
27 See the Second Regular Reports from the Commission on these countries 
(Chapter B.1 of the Lithuania report; Chapter B.1 of the Hungary report). 
28 See also the Commission’s White Paper on the Preparation of the Associated 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal 
Market of the Union (COM (95) 163 final). The Commission stresses that 
intellectual property is an area which will create new requirements for the 
CEEC judges, both in terms of training and of adapting judicial processes to 
allow cases to come to court more quickly (point 4.30). 
29 See, in particular, A.W.H. Meij, ‘Europese rechtspraak in de Nederlandse 
rechtspleging: Impressies uit Den Haag en Luxemburg’, p. 133 in Internatio-
nale rechtspraak in de Nederlandse rechtsorde (Handelingen NJV, 1999-I).  
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15 REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE: THE PRELIMINARY 
RULING PROCEDURE 
During the course of proceedings before the national court, it may appear that the 
court cannot deliver final judgment without having solved a question of EU law. In 
such circumstances Community law has always offered the national court the 
possibility of requesting the Court of Justice for assistance. By putting a prelim-
inary question under Article 234 (ex 177) EC it may obtain a ruling of the Court of 
Justice on the interpretation of EC law, or on the validity of a Community act. 
Recently, the Amsterdam Treaty has complicated the situation as it added two 
‘special’ preliminary rulings procedures to the text of the Treaties (Article 68 TEC 
and Article 35 TEU).  
 
First the main elements of these three preliminary reference procedures are briefly 
described (paragraph 15.1). On the basis of the description of the current situation, 
it is assessed how the preliminary ruling procedures will function after Eastern en-
largement (paragraph 15.2). In the light of this assessment, two categories of pos-
sible reforms are examined.  
 
The first category brings together several ideas and proposals which essentially 
would result in the ‘weakening’ of the preliminary reference procedure (as com-
pared with the present situation). Such ideas have been advocated, in particular, 
by the Court of Justice itself.1 The underlying idea is to reduce the heavy workload 
of the Court and enlargement is seen as one of the main reasons for a further 
increase of cases under Article 234 EC (paragraph 15.3).  
 
Attention is also given to the possibility that the preliminary ruling procedures 
could be further strengthened. This second group of ideas and proposals empha-
sises that effective and rapid judicial protection for individuals is even more im-
portant in an enlarged European Union than it already is in the Union of fifteen 
Member States (paragraph 15.4).  
 
At the end of this paragraph, some attention is devoted to the idea of transferring 
jurisdiction under Article 234 EC from the Court of Justice to the Court of First 
Instance (CFI). The idea to give the CFI the competence to give preliminary rulings 
is addressed separately, since it should be considered as a more or less ‘neutral’ 
proposal. It is difficult to predict whether or not such (partial) transfer would 
result in better judicial protection for individuals (paragraph 15.5). 
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15.1 THE CURRENT SITUATION: THREE PRELIMINARY REFERENCE 
PROCEDURES AFTER AMSTERDAM 
The preliminary ruling procedure of Article 234 (ex Article 177) EC is of particular 
importance to individuals as they are usually involved in legal disputes with other 
individuals or with Member State authorities. In these situations no direct access 
to the Courts in Luxembourg exists, the firm or citizen will have to bring legal pro-
ceedings before the competent national court. In case these national courts are 
confronted with questions of Community law, they are entitled – and sometimes 
obliged – to ask for the assistance of the EU Court. The latter may assist the nation-
al judges by giving an authoritative interpretation of the EC Treaty or of secondary 
legislation and by ruling on the validity of the acts of the EC institutions.2 Thus, 
citizens and private companies can usually only obtain a judgment of the EC Court 
in an indirect way, that is, through the intermediary of the national court. 
 
With regard to the role of the national courts, Article 234 EC lays down two general 
rules. First, the court of a Member State against whose decisions there is still a 
judicial remedy under national law (the lower courts) may ask the EU Court to 
interpret a rule of Community law or to rule on the validity of an act of the insti-
tutions, if it considers that such ruling is necessary for it to give final judgment. As 
an exception to this rule, lower courts are obliged to refer where they entertain 
serious doubts as to the validity of a Community act.3  
 
The general rule for the supreme (or highest) courts of the Member States – i.e. 
courts whose decisions are no longer open to appeal – is that they are obliged to 
make references to the Court of Justice if they consider that a decision of the Court 
is necessary to enable them to give final judgment.4 This obligation to refer con-
stitutes a crucial mechanism for ensuring that Community law is interpreted and 
applied in a uniform manner throughout the entire Union. Nevertheless, the Court 
has accepted three exceptions to the rule: highest courts are entitled – but not 
obliged – to refer if the Court has already ruled on the same or a similar question 
(acte éclairé),5 if the correct interpretation of a rule of Community law is obvious 
(acte clair),6 or if the highest court is asked to grant interim relief.7 
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam added two ‘special’ preliminary ruling procedures to the 
Treaties, one in the first pillar (Article 68 EC) and one in the third pillar (Article 35 
TEU). Questions under Article 68 EC must deal with the issues mentioned in Title 
IV of the EC Treaty (visa, asylum, immigration but also judicial co-operation in civil 
matters). More specifically, these preliminary questions must relate to the inter-
pretation of the provisions of Title IV or the interpretation or validity of acts of the 
EC institutions adopted under Title IV. Under Article 68 EC the highest courts of 
the Member States are entitled and, at the same time, obliged to request the Court 
to give a preliminary ruling in case they consider a ruling necessary. Lower courts 
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are not mentioned in this Treaty provision, which implies that they are neither 
entitled, nor obliged to refer. 
 
The most important difference between the two EC procedures thus relates to the 
position of the lower courts in the various Member States. They were always used 
to having a direct link to the Court in Luxembourg, something which they often 
used: in recent years, approximately 75 per cent of all preliminary questions has 
emanated from the lower courts.8 After Amsterdam, no such direct link exists 
where questions on asylum, visa policy and– not to be forgotten – European civil 
law are raised before them. In fact, the lower courts will have to tell parties before 
them, that they should exhaust all national judicial remedies. Only then it becomes 
possible to refer to ‘Luxembourg’.9 
 
The second preliminary reference procedure, introduced by the Amsterdam 
Treaty, is to be found in the third pillar on police and judicial co-operation in cri-
minal matters. According to Article 35(1) TEU the Court has jurisdiction to give 
preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of framework decisions and 
decisions,10 on the interpretation of conventions established under Title VI of the 
EU Treaty and on the validity and interpretation of the measures implementing 
them.11 This jurisdiction is, however, not compulsory per se: any Member State has 
been given the power to accept or refuse the Court’s jurisdiction to give prelimi-
nary rulings under Article 35 TEU. Four of the present Member States (UK, France, 
Ireland and Denmark) have, indeed, rejected any jurisdiction of the Court to rule 
on the validity or interpretation of the third pillar decisions mentioned above. As a 
result, the national courts of these four states are neither entitled nor obliged to 
refer to the Court.12  
 
Once a Member State has (voluntarily) accepted the Court’s jurisdiction, it may 
specify that either any of its courts may request the Court to give preliminary 
rulings, or that only its highest courts may do so. Hence, in neither case does the 
EU Treaty impose an obligation on the highest national courts to ask the Court for 
preliminary rulings. This is of course a significant difference with the two Commu-
nity reference procedures. Member States are, however, entitled to lay down in 
their national law an obligation for their highest courts to refer questions on PJCC 
matters to the Court of Justice.13  
 
 
15.2 PRELIMINARY REFERENCES AFTER ENLARGEMENT 
It is no exaggeration to say that the functioning of the Article 234 EC preliminary 
ruling procedure constitutes the ‘hard core’ of the present crisis regarding the EC’s 
system of judicial protection. Due to the increase in cases brought under Article 
234 EC, the average duration of preliminary procedures has already increased con-
siderably: 12,6 months in 1983; 17,4 months in 1990; 21,4 months in 1998.14 
Hence, a national judge who decides to ask the Court of Justice for assistance will 
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have to wait some two years before an answer is received from ‘Luxembourg’. Of 
course, this delay is hardly acceptable, given the fact that the Article 234 procedure 
constitutes the main channel for national courts to turn to the Court of Justice. At 
the same time, the legal protection of thousands of individuals is negatively af-
fected as they very often do not have direct access to the Court.15 There are two 
main reasons for the increase in caseload under Article 234 EC. First, in the course 
of time the Community has gained legislative competences in more and more 
policy areas. Secondly, the various accessions contributed significantly to the in-
crease in workload and hence to the increase of the average duration.16 
 
It is rather obvious that the next enlargement of the Union will bring a further in-
crease in the number of cases brought under Article 234 EC. According to Kapteyn, 
the Dutch judge at the Court of Justice, the number of preliminary references may 
double or even triple in the next ten years to come.17 This is the main reason why it 
is argued that it will be necessary to introduce radical changes in order to cope 
effectively with the requests for help from the national judiciary in the longer run 
(see further paragraph 15.3). 
 
Further, it is noted that before actual accession, the judicial organs of the CEECs are 
not (yet) entitled, nor obliged, to refer question on EC law to the Court in Luxem-
bourg. All three provisions (Article 68 EC, Article 234 EC and Article 35 EU) refer to 
courts and tribunals “of a Member State”, which implies that the interpretation of, 
in particular, the Europe Agreements is a matter for the CEECs judiciary alone. 
Therefore, the Hungarian Supreme Court was probably not entitled to request the 
Court for assistance when it had to decide on the compatibility of certain provi-
sions of the Hungarian constitution with the EC-Hungary Europe Agreement.18  
 
The courts of the current Member States, on the other hand, do have the power (or 
even the obligation) to refer questions on the interpretation of these Agreements 
to the Court of Justice as they form an ‘integral part’ of Community law.19 
 
 
15.3 POSSIBLE REFORMS: THE RESTRICTIVE APPROACH 
In this paragraph several possibilities to reform the preliminary reference pro-
cedure are discussed. They have in common that they aim at reducing the caseload 
of the Court but, at the same time, have the result of weakening the judicial pro-
tection of individuals. The Court of Justice itself has put forward such ‘restrictive’ 
ideas, inter alia by delivering a paper entitled The future of the Judicial System of 
the European Union. Of course, the coming enlargement is not the only reason for 
reforming the Article 234 procedure in order to reduce the Court’s caseload. 
Already years ago it was asked whether the preliminary ruling procedure had 
become a victim of its own success.20 Later, the extension of the Community’s 
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fields of activity contributed to a further increase in workload under Article 234 
(ex 177) EC. 
 
 
15.3.1 LIMITATION OF THE NATIONAL COURTS EMPOWERED TO REFER 
At present every court of a Member State is empowered to make preliminary refer-
ences to the Court under Article 234 EC, whereas the highest courts are bound to 
refer. In order to reduce the workload of the Court the number of national courts 
empowered to make references could be limited. As was pointed out above, the 
Treaty of Amsterdam already provides for two examples of such limitations. In the 
area of visas, asylum and immigration only the highest national courts are em-
powered and obliged to make preliminary references (Article 68 EC). In the area of 
police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, any Member State which has 
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction may specify that either any of its courts may 
request the Court to give preliminary rulings, or that only its highest courts may do 
so (Article 35 TEU). 
 
In an enlarged Union it may prove necessary to introduce similar restrictions in 
the general provision of Article 234 EC as well. One option is to reserve the power 
and obligation to make references under this Treaty provision to supreme courts 
alone (as is already the case as far as questions on asylum and immigration are 
concerned).21 Another option would be to replace the obligation for highest judges 
to ask for preliminary rulings (in the third paragraph of Article 234 EC) by a mere 
possibility to do so. A third option is to follow the rules laid down in the Protocol 
on the interpretation by the Court of the Convention on jurisdiction and the recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.22 According 
to this Protocol, only national courts of first instance are excluded from asking the 
Court for preliminary rulings on the interpretation of this Convention. Courts of 
appeal are entitled to refer, whereas certain highest courts of each Member State 
(specifically mentioned in the Protocol) are obliged to make preliminary references 
to the Court.23 
 
These various options have the ‘advantage’ of reducing the workload of the Court, 
probably to a significant extent since in the last few years approximately 75 per 
cent of all preliminary questions emanated from lower judges.24 It should however 
be stressed that the general procedure of Article 234 EC is used, by national judges, 
to ask the Court for clarification of the ‘hard core’ of Community law. Questions 
under Article 234 EC deal with the interpretation of the concept of internal market, 
the interpretation of the EC rules on competition policy, common policies such as 
agriculture or transport, the interpretation or validity of environmental measures, 
etc. Therefore, limitations regarding access to the Court would have the effect of 
seriously jeopardising the uniform application and interpretation of the most im-
portant parts of Community law. At the same time, individuals would be deprived 
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of effective judicial protection to a considerable extent, as most of the cases 
involving citizens or private firms are dealt with by the national courts.  
 
We therefore believe that all national courts should retain the right to ask the 
Court of Justice for help under Article 234 EC, including the courts and tribunals of 
the CEECs once they have acceded to the Union.25 Moreover, it is indispensable to 
maintain the obligation to refer for the national courts against whose decisions 
there is no judicial remedy under national law. Without such obligation a body of 
national case law not in accordance with the rules of Community law could come 
into existence in any given Member State.26 
 
 
15.3.2 INTRODUCTION OF A FILTERING SYSTEM AT THE CENTRAL LEVEL? 
At present, it is for the national judges to decide if and when questions on the 
interpretation or validity of Community law are referred to the Court in Luxem-
bourg. Once the national court has decided to ask the Court of Justice for assis-
tance, the latter is, in principle, obliged to answer these questions.27 Only in ex-
ceptional circumstances will the Court refuse to reply. This is the case where the 
national judge does not provide the Court with sufficient information on the 
factual and legal background of the main proceedings,28 or where the answer of the 
Court is not really necessary for the national judge to solve the dispute before 
him.29 
 
Hence, to a very large extent the Court of Justice cannot control its own workload 
under Article 234 EC. Essentially, the central Community Court is dependent on 
the judicial substructures in the Member States. Against this background several 
ideas have been put forward to give the Court of Justice the right to decide which 
of the preliminary questions need to be answered by it on account of, for example, 
their novelty, complexity or importance. Such a power of the Court essentially 
boils down to the introduction of a filtering system at the central Union level. The 
advantages of such a central a certiorari system are quite obvious: a reduction of 
workload and therefore more room for the Court to concentrate on the really im-
portant preliminary questions, that is, those which require novel interpretations, 
elaboration of fundamental principles, a statement on the validity of a Community 
act, et cetera.  
 
On the other hand, there are some serious objections to the idea of introducing a 
filtering system at the Court’s level. First, a rather obvious objection is that the 
judicial protection of individuals may be affected in a negative way. Second, a right 
of selection would in fact create a hierarchical relationship between the Court of 
Justice and the national courts. The unilateral right of one court to refuse to 
answer questions emanating from other courts does not fit into a system of judicial 
co-operation.30 In this respect the Due Report rightly points out that there exists 
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an important difference with the legal system of the United States.31 The American 
a certiorari system32 is clearly embedded in a hierarchical legal system: the US 
Supreme Court may refuse to give a ruling on a question emanating from an sub-
ordinate American court. In the European Union, on the contrary, there does not 
exist a hierarchy between the EU Court of Justice and the national courts of the 
Member States.33  
 
 
15.3.3 FILTERING AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
Another possibility to reduce the workload of the Court is to create judicial bodies 
at the national level which would – in one way or the other – be responsible for 
‘dealing with’ preliminary references from courts within their area of territorial 
jurisdiction. A common feature of the various ideas on the establishment of – what 
might be termed – Regional EU Courts is that they would have to consist of judges 
specialised in the law of the Union, in particular European Community law. They 
would also have the task of gathering the various preliminary questions emanating 
from the (subordinate) courts in the territory. 
 
With regard to other aspects the ideas differ greatly, in particular on the link (via 
preliminary questions) between the Regional Court and the Court of Justice. In 
this respect the most radical idea is to abandon any link and give to the Regional 
EU Court the right to give the final preliminary judgment on the interpretation or 
validity of EC law. We can be very brief about this radical modality: as it essentially 
comes down to a complete transferral of preliminary jurisdiction from the central 
level (Court of Justice) to the regional level (some 25, or even more, Regional EU 
Courts) the idea can be rejected from the outset. Without any direct link to the 
Court of Justice, the supervision of EC law would become totally decentralised and 
hence the uniform application throughout the Union would become a fiction.  
 
Most of the ideas on the creation of Regional EU Courts, however, rightly assume 
that (at least) these courts should have access (via preliminary questions) to the 
Court in Luxembourg.34 The courts ‘subordinate’ to the Regional Courts would, 
however, no longer have the competence to turn to the Court of Justice directly. 




15.4 REFORMS AIMED AT STRENGTHENING THE SYSTEM OF 
PRELIMINARY REFERENCES 
The ideas on reforming the preliminary reference mechanism discussed in the 
previous paragraph are essentially aimed at making the procedure more ‘effective’ 
and thus reducing the caseload of the Court. From the point of view of individuals, 
however, such proposals essentially result in a less effective and less rapid protec-
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tion of EU law rights. As it can be expected that the preliminary ruling procedure 
will become the most important (indirect) way for thousands of CEEC individuals 
(citizens, entrepreneurs, etc.) to obtain an authoritative judgment of the Court of 
Justice, there is also a need to address the question how this unique procedure 
could be strengthened in practice. 
 
Some of the many ideas put forward on how to improve the system of preliminary 
references – seen from the standpoint of individuals (natural and legal persons) – 
are explored below. In the first place one can defend the thesis that the two special 
preliminary reference procedures, introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty, should be 
adapted in order to bring them into line with the ‘traditional’ preliminary ruling 
procedure of Article 234 (ex 177) EC (paragraph 15.4.1).  
 
At the other end of the spectrum from the proposals to introduce some kind of 
filtering system one could argue that the ‘filters’ which the Court has already 
introduced should be removed. We are referring to the case law according to which 
the Court refuses to answer preliminary questions because its judgment is not 
necessary for the national court to give final judgment (‘hypothetical’ cases) or 
because the national court does not provide sufficient information as to the 
background of the dispute before him (paragraph 15.4.2). 
 
Finally, some brief attention is given to the ‘old’ idea of introducing a right of 
appeal to the Court of Justice for parties to the main proceedings, in case they 
believe the national court concerned misinterpreted EC law (paragraph 15.4.3).  
 
 
15.4.1 BRINGING THE SPECIAL REFERENCE PROCEDURES IN LINE WITH THE GENERAL 
PROCEDURE 
As was outlined above, the main difference between the two preliminary reference 
procedures contained in the EC Treaty (Articles 68 and 234 EC) relates to the power 
of the lower courts to refer questions to the Court of Justice. Under the general 
procedure of Article 234 EC each and every lower court is entitled to ask the Court 
of Justice for assistance; under the specific procedure of Article 68 EC all these 
lower courts are excluded from making references to the Court. Bringing the Ar-
ticle 68 EC procedure in line with Article 234 EC would involve extending the power 
to refer questions on asylum, immigration and civil law to all branches of the 
national judiciary (court of first instance, appeal courts, regional courts, etc.).  
We believe that there are strong reasons supporting such an extension, even 
though this would certainly further increase the workload of the Court. The main 
argument is that Title IV deals with matters which are of particular interest to 
private citizens. This includes not only third country nationals (probably mainly 
asylum seekers) but also, since Title IV includes co-operation in civil matters, 
numerous citizens with EU nationality.  
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The Treaty provisions of Title IV themselves (Article 61-69 TEC) do not seem of 
direct interest to these groups of individuals since, essentially, all of them have the 
character of providing a legal basis, e.g. Treaty provisions which enable the EC in-
stitutions to adopt secondary legislation.36 By the time of accession however the EC 
institutions will probably have exercised the powers conferred upon them by these 
Treaty provisions. In other words, at the moment of accession the EC institutions, 
acting under Title IV, will have adopted numerous (legally binding) secondary 
acts. For example, following the Vienna Action Plan,37 ‘hard’ secondary law on 
such sensitive issues as the readmission of third-country nationals and the right to 
family reunification is now being prepared.38 From the civil law area several re-
markable developments can be reported as well. The well-known Brussels Con-
vention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters will probably be ‘transformed’ into a Regulation, based on Title IV.39 
Another important example is the initiative of Germany and Finland for a Council 
Regulation on insolvency procedures.40  
 
Thus, courts, lawyers and individuals concerned with migration and civil law 
(including those in the CEECs) will have to get used to the idea that a considerable 
part of ‘their’ legal rules will originate from the Community. This however should 
be accompanied by the possibility to obtain rapid decisions of the Court on the 
interpretation or validity of acts adopted under Title IV of the EC Treaty.41 
 
The realisation of this proposal would require a Treaty amendment, in concreto a 
very simple one: the deletion of Article 68 EC.42 No amendment of Article 234 EC 
would be necessary as Title IV forms part and parcel of ‘this Treaty’ (within the 
meaning of Article 234, under a). The Court’s jurisdiction to give a ruling con-
cerning “the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Commu-
nity” (Article 234, under b) would include the competence to rule on the validity 
and interpretation of acts which are based on Title IV of the EC Treaty (once Article 
68 EC has been removed from the text of the EC Treaty). It however remains an 
open question whether the Treaty will actually be amended in this way. The fact 
that the text of Article 68 EC does not mention (national) courts of first instance, 
nor appeal courts, was not a haphazard omission; it was the explicit intention of 
the drafters of the Amsterdam Treaty to limit the number of judicial bodies em-
powered to make references, given the fact that preliminary questions under 
Article 68 EC deal with sensitive issues such as immigration, asylum and visa 
policy.43 
 
With regard to the preliminary ruling procedure of the third pillar (Article 35 TEU) 
more fundamental reforms would be necessary to bring this procedure in line with 
the general preliminary reference procedure of Article 234 EC. First and foremost, 
the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 35 TEU would have to be made compul-
sory, in the sense that Member States would no longer have the right to make a 
declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction or not. Nevertheless, we believe that 
there are good reasons for such a change, mainly because it is not unlikely that 
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many of the CEECs will refrain from accepting the Court’s jurisdiction in third pillar 
matters. After all, Title VI of the Union Treaty is concerned with the extremely 
sensitive issue of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters. 
 
Like Title IV of the EC Treaty, the Third Pillar will have been worked out by numer-
ous secondary acts once the first wave of newcomers accedes. The Vienna Action 
Plan has already made clear that the Union should adopt much more legally 
binding decisions on police and justice co-operation.44 In particular, PJCC frame-
work decisions on sensitive issues such as the combat of fraud, terrorism and 
criminal offences against children will have become part and parcel of the Union’s 
acquis. Recently a number of proposals for third pillar acts has been put forward 
by the Commission and Member States on such delicate issues as the combat of 
fraud of non-cash payments and the protection against counterfeiting in con-
nection with the euro.45  
 
If the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 35 TEU is made compulsory – something 
which, of course, cannot be taken for granted – some more sophisticated issues in 
relation to the Article 35 TEU procedure may be considered.  
 
First, the Court’s jurisdiction could be extended in order to give it the competence 
to rule on the interpretation of PJCC Treaty provisions. At present, it seems that 
the Court does not have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpre-
tation of ‘primary PJCC law’ as the list mentioned in Article 35(1) TEU seems to be 
exhaustive. In this respect the Court’s jurisdiction is clearly more limited than its 
jurisdiction under Article 234 EC, given the fact that under Article 234(a) EC the 
Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning “the interpretation of 
this Treaty”. Future case law will have to prove whether the prohibition to inter-
pret primary PJCC law is really workable. For example, how can the Court rule on 
the validity of a framework decision without interpreting PJCC Treaty provisions 
first, in particular the PJCC Treaty provision which serves as the legal basis for this 
framework decision?46 
 
Second, an obligation to refer could be imposed on the highest national courts by 
the EU Treaty directly. As was pointed out earlier, the Amsterdam Treaty left it to 
the discretion of the Member States (which have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction 
under Article 35 TEU) to determine whether or not their supreme courts are bound 
to refer. The concrete result of this kind of ‘flexibility’ is that, at the moment, the 
highest courts of only seven of the eleven Member States which have accepted the 
Court’s jurisdiction under Article 35(1) are bound to refer.47  
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15.4.2 A FURTHER ‘DE-FILTERING’ OF PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS? 
Contrary to the idea of introducing some kind of filtering system, one could also 
imagine that the existing ‘filters’ be removed. As was already mentioned above, we 
are referring to the case law of the Court according to which it refuses to answer 
preliminary questions where the national court merely addresses a ‘hypothetical’ 
matter and where it does not provide the Court with sufficient background infor-
mation.48  
 
The first exception is not a serious option, as the Court is not a legal advisor which 
delivers “advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions”. Instead, it is a 
judicial organ which assists the national courts in the resolution of genuine dis-
putes.49 Hence, the preliminary rulings procedure cannot be used by national 
judges as a kind of training course in EU law. For that purpose other means exist, 
such as the Phare, Schumann and Grotius programmes. 
 
The second exception, however, raises more concerns. Where a national court does 
not provide the Court of Justice with sufficient information on the factual and legal 
background of the case before it, the Court chooses not to answer the questions. 
However, instead of declaring an unsatisfactory question inadmissible, the Court 
could request the national court to provide it with additional information on the 
factual and legal background of the case.50 Such a change of the Court’s ‘policy’ 
would be of great importance to the CEEC judiciary and to the parties before them.51 
It may be expected that the first years after accession the CEEC judiciary has to in-
crease significantly its familiarity with EU law. Given its extremely complex and 
diverse nature, some understanding and tolerance will need to be displayed at the 
difficulties facing the CEEC judiciary. Otherwise the judges of the new members 
may not, or no longer, be inclined to ask the Court for help. Indeed, “national 
judges are scarcely encouraged to co-operate in the application of EC law if their 
requests for preliminary rulings are sent back as inadmissible”.52 
 
Going one step further, preliminary questions emanating from quasi-judicial 
bodies (such as arbitration tribunals, Ombudsmen, administrative appeal organs) 
must also be mentioned. Until now, their questions are declared inadmissible by 
the Court as they do not emanate from a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of 
Article 234 EC.53 In case of doubt, the Court will take a number of factors into 
account in order to determine whether a national body is a court or tribunal in the 
sense of Article 234 EC and, hence, whether or not it is empowered to refer. These 
factors include, in particular, whether the body is established by law, whether it is 
permanent, whether its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter 
partes, whether it applies rules of law and whether it is independent.54  
 
The application of these criteria will usually lead to the conclusion that arbitration 
tribunals are not empowered to refer, even though they may have to decide on the 
interpretation of EC law.55 Probably the same conclusion must be drawn with re-
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gard to the institute of the Ombudsman, an institution which is of particular 
importance to many individuals in the Eastern European Countries.  
 
 The introduction of such a ‘de-filtering system’ – that is, giving the right to refer to 
quasi- or semi-judicial organs – would have the advantage of obtaining more 
quickly a judgment from the Court of Justice. Still, extending the power to make 
references to the Court to all kinds of quasi-judicial bodies may be considered ‘a 
bridge too far’, as it could increase the case load of the Court significantly.  
 
 
15.4.3 A RIGHT OF APPEAL FOR PARTIES TO THE MAIN PROCEEDINGS?  
In order to enhance the legal protection of parties to the main proceeding, they 
could be given a direct right of appeal to the Court of Justice where they believe a 
national court has incorrectly interpreted or applied a rule of Community law. 
Such a right of appeal could be confined to incorrect interpretations of EC law by 
supreme courts as only the courts of last instance are under an obligation to re-
fer.56 Such a right of appeal could provide an adequate means to address alleged 
breaches of Treaty provisions, for example breaches of Article 234(3) TEC. As was 
pointed out earlier, the latter provision obliges supreme courts to make references 
to the Court. Yet, quite often highest courts take the position that one of the excep-
tions to the rule applies, for example the acte clair exception, whereas a party to 
the main proceedings argues that the correct interpretation of the Community rule 
concerned is not evident at all.57 In the present situation private parties have no 
further legal remedies in this situation. This dependence on the ‘good-will’ of the 
national judge has even been described as the ‘inherent weakness’ of the prelim-
inary ruling mechanism.58  
 
This right of appeal could also include alleged incorrect interpretations of existing 
case law of the Court of Justice by national courts. For example, the view of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht that it has the power to declare secondary EC law in-
applicable in the territory of Germany is clearly not in conformity with the Court’s 
Fost-Frost judgment.59 
 
An important advantage of a right to appeal is that it would provide an effective 
corrective to breaches of Article 234(3) EC by highest judges, in particular against 
unjustified applications of the acte clair theory. As a result, Community law may be 
interpreted and applied incorrectly for many years. An example is the (former) 
view of the French Conseil d’Etat that EC Directives do not have direct effect, a 
matter which was considered to be so obvious that no reference to the Court of 
Justice was made.60 Nevertheless, a few years earlier the latter had already ruled 
that EC Directive could be invoked by individuals against Member States author-
ities.61  
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The main objection to this proposal is, however, that the nature of the preliminary 
reference procedure would alter dramatically. The Court has always emphasised 
that this procedure establishes a form of ‘judicial co-operation’, which requires 
that the national court and the Court of Justice, both keeping within their res-
pective jurisdiction, make direct and complementary contributions to the working 
out of a decision.62 If parties to the main proceedings were given a right of appeal, 
the national judges would essentially become subordinate to the Court of Justice 
and hence the nature of the ‘partnership’ would change irrevocably. For this 
reason we do not believe that it would be a good idea to introduce such a right of 
appeal, despite the clear advantages in terms of individual legal protection. 
 
 
15.5 THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE AND PRELIMINARY REFERENCES 
Article 225 (ex Article 168a) of the EC Treaty explicitly states that the Court of First 
Instance (CFI) shall not be competent to hear and determine questions referred for 
a preliminary ruling under Article 234 EC. The increase in the number of prelim-
inary references caused by, inter alia, the Union’s enlargement may however con-
stitute a reason to reconsider the law as it stands. Should not the CFI be given the 
power to give preliminary rulings in at least certain specific fields of EC policy? 
 
Although the idea seems to be quite attractive and to have acquired some curren-
cy,63 we would stress that a (partial) transfer of jurisdiction could seriously jeop-
ardise the uniform interpretation and application of EC law. The Court of Justice 
would have the final word on the interpretation and validity of certain parts of EC 
law (presumably the ‘hard core’ of Community law, including the provisions on the 
four freedoms of the internal market), whereas the Court of First Instance would 
give the final (preliminary) judgment on the interpretation or validity of other 
parts of Community law (presumably more specific issues, such as intellectual 
property legislation and the very complex rules on the Common Customs Tariff). 
Although these two judicial organs belong to the same institution (the ‘Court of 
Justice’ within the meaning of Article 7 EC), it cannot be ruled out that the Court of 
First Instance interprets ‘its’ part of EC law in a different way than the Court of 
Justice does. Practice in the field of direct actions indeed shows that their views do 
not always match: a number of judgments of the Court of First Instance delivered 
under Article 230 EC (direct actions for annulment of secondary acts) has been 
annulled by the Court of Justice at a later stage.64 
 
Of course, one may argue that the danger of inconsistent case law may be offset by 
the simultaneous introduction of a right of appeal to the Court against preliminary 
rulings of the CFI. After all, it is also possible to appeal against a judgment of the 
CFI delivered in direct actions.65 The final word would then remain in the hands of 
just one central Community judge, namely the Court of Justice (as an organ, not as 
an EC institution).  
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Still, the serious disadvantage is that such a right of appeal would excessively pro-
long a large number of preliminary ruling procedures. National courts and the 
parties before them already have to wait some two years before they get an answer 
from ‘fairy-tale land’; where under the new system an appeal is lodged against the 
CFI’s preliminary judgment (but by who?), this period may be extended with an-
other two or three years period. Mainly for this reason, the two Courts themselves 
argue that a transfer of jurisdiction to the Court of First Instance should, in prin-
ciple, not be accompanied by a right of appeal to the Court of Justice. Only in case 
it is necessary to “safeguard the unity and coherence of Community law”, the Court 
of Justice should have the power to review preliminary rulings given by the Court 
of First Instance.66 
 
Indeed, we would agree that if and when jurisdiction is transferred to the CFI, the 
possibility of appeal should be ruled out, except perhaps in some exceptional cir-
cumstances. Because of this reason, together with the fact that the views of the two 
Courts may not always be identical (see above), we believe that the drafters of the 
Treaty should be very reluctant in transferring heads of jurisdiction under Article 
234 EC to the CFI. 
 
Only in very specific cases should such a transfer be considered, in particular 
where this would really speed up the preliminary ruling procedure (as compared to 
the situation where the Court of Justice is competent to deliver all preliminary 
rulings). The existing expertise at the CFI would have to be the central criterion 
(intellectual property, competition cases, etc.), and not so much criteria such as 
‘the importance of the matter’ or ‘constitutional relevance’. Our most important 
point however remains that if the CFI were to acquire jurisdiction to give prelim-
inary rulings, it should be the sole responsibility for the Court of First Instance to 
deliver judgment (and hence no right of appeal). The risk that the Court of Justice 
might have decided in a different way must then be accepted. 
 
The realisation of the proposal to transfer jurisdiction to the CFI would require an 
amendment of the EC Treaty because, as was pointed out above, the Treaty now ex-
plicitly excludes any jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance with regard to pre-
liminary rulings. A rather modest step would be to give the Council the right to de-
cide on the conferral of (limited) jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance.  
The IGC 2000 would then merely have to decide on the principle, that is, create the 
possibility of a transfer. It would be for the Council to adopt the specific decisions 
at a later stage: what type of cases should be transferred to the CFI? 
 
This modest option is preferred by the two Courts themselves. In their contribu-
tion to the IGC 2000, they state that in their view the second paragraph of Article 
225 EC should read as follows: “The Court of First Instance may also be called upon 
to hear and determine questions referred for a preliminary ruling pursuant to 
Article 234, in certain matters to be defined in accordance with the conditions laid 
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down in paragraph 3”. Under the latter paragraph the Council should act 
unanimously, at the request of the Court of Justice and after consulting the 
European Parliament and the Commission.  
 
 
15.6 COMMENTS AND ASSESSMENT 
Considering the various ‘restrictive’ ideas discussed above, it seems that only a 
very ‘soft’ variant of filtering systems can be recommended. National courts could 
be encouraged to develop considerable reluctance to turn to the Court of Justice 
for assistance. First and foremost they should be required to consider whether the 
proposed question really raises important questions of interpretation of EC law, 
whether or not the question has already been answered in the past, and whether 
they could not interpret the EC provision concerned on their own. In short, they 
should seriously consider whether they really cannot solve the puzzle on their own. 
It would, however, remain a matter for the national court alone to decide whether 
it refers or not; the Court in Luxembourg would, in this view, not be given the pos-
sibility to give a second (binding) opinion as to the ‘importance’ of the question 
and, therefore, it would not have the right to declare the preliminary question in-
admissible after all. In fact, the Court would have no real sanctions at its disposal 
but would merely have to rely on greater self-restraint on the part of the national 
judiciary. 
 
This opinion comes close to the ideas formulated by Advocate General Jacobs,67 
the Dutch judge at the Court of First Instance68 as well as the Due Working Group. 
The latter proposes to add to the text of the Treaties the requirement that the 
lower judges, before exercising their discretion to make a reference, should assess 
the importance of the question for Community law and should consider whether 
there exists a reasonable doubt as to how the Court of Justice will respond.69 
Regarding the supreme courts, it is suggested that a similar provision be added: 
they would be obliged to refer when they consider that the question raises a suffi-
ciently important issue of Community law and where there exists a reasonable 
doubt as to how the Court would answer.70 
 
This not very radical change could potentially be of great importance to the CEEC 
judges in the sense that from the very outset they would be encouraged to make 
selective and occasional use of the resources offered by the preliminary reference 
facility. At the same time they would be encouraged to familiarise themselves with 
the considerable existing body of Court case law on the various subjects and to 
develop a facility to apply that body of case law in practice to the different factual 
situations with which they are confronted. 
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16 BREACH OF COMMUNITY LAW OBLIGATIONS BY 
MEMBER STATES 
Since the very beginning of the process of European integration the Commission 
has been given the power to bring Member States before the Court of Justice for 
failing to fulfil their obligations under the EC Treaty (Article 226 EC, ex Article 169 
EC). Extensive attention should be given to this form of direct action as it can be 
expected that the infringement procedure will become the most important central-
ised way for ensuring that the new Member States respect their Treaty obligations. 
It is quite remarkable that little attention has been given to the functioning of this 
procedure after enlargement, although it may be expected that the infringement 
procedure will significantly contribute to a further increase of caseload of the 
Court. The present focus is on the expected flow of preliminary questions from 
Eastern European judges. Nevertheless, the ‘bottom-up’ way presupposes that 
‘vigilant’ individuals are prepared to institute legal proceedings; that national 
courts are prepared to refer to Luxembourg; and that there is a provision of 
Community law which is suitable of being invoked by private individuals. Action 
by the Commission under Article 226 EC, on the other hand, does not depend on 
legal actions undertaken at the national level. Moreover, in the framework of 
Article 226 proceedings it is irrelevant whether or not the EC law provisions at 
stake have direct effect. This means that the Commission may bring infringement 
actions for breach of ‘diffuse’ acts such as many environmental directives.1  
 
A brief discussion of the main elements of the present procedure (para. 16.1) is 
necessary to explain why the Article 226 EC procedure will have a considerable 
‘impact’ on the new Member States (para. 16.2).2 The next step is to explore 
several options for reforming the Article 226 procedure, starting from the pre-
sumption that the new Members will, indeed, very often be brought before the 
Court by the Commission. Once again, a distinction is made between reforms 
which are intended to weaken the infringement procedure (as compared with its 
present functioning) and ideas which emphasise that in an enlarged Union it is 
even more important to bring recalcitrant Member States easily and quickly to 
justice. Ideas which go in the first direction, for example, are those developed on 
the compulsory nature of the procedure, or the central role which Article 226 EC 
assigns to the Court of Justice (para. 16.3). In the opposite direction, we find re-
forms such as the extension of the current procedure to the two non-Community 
pillars, and – as the Due Report proposes – the idea to reverse the roles of the 
Commission and the Member States during the judicial phase of the infringement 
procedure (para. 16.4). Finally, some attention is given to the possible transfer of 
jurisdiction under Article 226 EC to the Court of First Instance (para. 16.5). 
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16.1 BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE INFRINGEMENT PROCEDURE 
As the central ‘guardian of the Treaties’, the Commission must ensure that the pro-
visions of the EC Treaty and the measures taken by the EC institutions pursuant 
thereto are applied (article 211 EC). In order to perform this task the Commission 
has been given, inter alia, the power to bring any Member State before the Court 
of Justice if the Commission considers that it has failed to fulfil an obligation 
under the EC Treaty. Before doing so, the Commission must give notice to the State 
concerned of its objections; it must give the Member State the opportunity to sub-
mit its observations and – if the matter cannot be settled – the Commission should 
deliver a reasoned opinion. After the completion of this so-called administrative 
phase, the Commission may bring the matter before the Court of Justice if the 
Member State concerned does not comply with the specific obligations laid down 
in its reasoned opinion.3 This second stage of the infringement procedure – the 
judicial stage – ends with the judgment of the Court, stating that the Member 
States has or has not breached one of its EC obligations. If the Court finds that the 
Member State concerned has indeed failed to fulfil its obligations – for example 
the non-implementation of a Directive – that State shall be required to take the 
necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court.4  
 
In practice, however, Member States quite often do not (fully) comply with these 
judgments of the Court. The Maastricht Treaty therefore reinforced the infringe-
ment procedure by giving the right to the Court to impose lump sums or penalty 
payments on the Member State concerned.5 Although, until now, the Court has 
never imposed a pecuniary sanction upon a Member State (under Article 228(2) 
EC), this is likely to change in the near future: in several pending cases the Com-
mission requests the Court to impose quite impressive sanctions on Member 
States for not implementing previous judgments under Article 226 EC.6  
 
 
16.2 THE INFRINGEMENT PROCEDURE AFTER ENLARGEMENT 
It can reasonably be expected that, soon after enlargement, the infringement pro-
cedure will be used quite often by the Commission to make the new Member States 
respect their EC obligations. On the one hand these countries have to accept 
(almost) the entire acquis communautaire as well as most of the new legislation to 
be adopted after accession. On the other hand these new members will probably 
not be ready to actually comply with all of their Treaty obligations, nor to imple-
ment each and every Community decision perfectly.  
 
These actions of the Commission will often result in a (binding) judgment of the 
Court stating that the Member State in question has indeed failed to comply with 
its obligations. Several reasons supporting this expectation can be referred to.  
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First, the Court has accepted that infringement proceedings may be brought 
against a Member State where it does not actually apply and enforce Community 
law, even though its formal legislation is in conformity with EC law. Notably in the 
field of environmental protection, the Court is prepared to ‘lift the veil’ and see 
whether the relevant environmental standards are actually applied in day-to-day 
life.7 Thus, the new Member States run the risk that the Commission will initiate 
infringement proceedings, when administrative authorities have not ensured that 
implemented legislation is actually applied and enforced in practice, even if the 
national legislature has done its job (by incorporating EU law - notably Directives - 
into national legislation correctly).  
 
Secondly, the Court hardly ever accepts justifications put forward by Member 
States for breaching their EC obligations. It is settled case law that a Member State 
may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal 
system in order to justify a failure to comply with its Community law obligations. 
An old but still striking example is the so-called Belgian wood case,8 where the 
Belgian government argued that it was not to blame for the failure to respect its 
obligations under Article 95 of the EEC Treaty (non-discrimination in the field of 
taxes). The delay was entirely caused by the Belgian parliament which had been 
unable to adopt the necessary legislative amendments in time (to eliminate the 
discrimination complained of by the Commission). The Court nevertheless 
‘condemned’ Belgium, stating that the obligations arising from the Treaty devolve 
upon the Member States as such. Therefore, the liability of a Member State under 
Article 226 EC remains, irrespective of the state agency whose action or inaction 
causes the failure to fulfil its obligations; even in the case of a constitutionally in-
dependent institution.9 Only where it is ‘absolutely impossible’ for a Member State 
to fulfil its obligations, the Court will accept this justification.10 
 
Finally, the Court has recently ruled that proceedings under Article 226 EC may 
also be brought against a Member State where the infringement of EC law essen-
tially emanates from actions by private individuals. In the case concerned11 French 
farmers had destroyed agricultural products from other Member States. The Com-
mission initiated an infringement procedure against the French state for breach of 
Article 28 EC (which prohibits quantitative restrictions and all measures having 
equivalent effect). Despite the French objections, the Court ruled that Article 28 
does not prohibit solely measures emanating from the State which create restric-
tions on trade between Member States; this provision also applies where a 
Member State abstains from adopting the measures required in order to deal with 
obstacles to the free movement of goods which are not caused by that State. The 
fact that a Member State abstains from taking action to prevent obstacles to the 
free movement of goods that are created by actions by private individuals on its 




REVAMPING THE EUROPEAN UNION’S ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS  
WITH A VIEW TO EASTERN ENLARGEMENT 
116 
16.3 WATERING DOWN THE INFRINGEMENT PROCEDURE 
In the Court’s 1999 report on the future of the judicial system most attention is 
devoted to the expected increase of workload under Article 234 EC (preliminary 
rulings). For the reasons mentioned in the previous paragraph, it cannot be ex-
cluded that the infringement procedure of Article 226 EC may cause an even 
greater increase in the workload of the Commission and the Court. This awesome 
perspective may one lead to the conclusion that reforms to the existing infringe-
ment procedure, aiming at its ‘watering down’, are indispensable. 
 
 
16.3.1 NO LONGER COMPULSORY JURISDICTION?  
A fundamental change would be to let Member States decide whether or not they 
accept the Commission’s power to bring infringement procedures against them. 
Changing the obligatory nature into a voluntary one, only for the new members 
from Eastern Europe, would, of course, meet with forceful opposition from the 
current fifteen members. And rightly so, as this kind of ‘flexibility’ would pose a 
very serious threat to the uniform respect for EC law by all member states, and, 
moreover, it could easily result in severe distortions of competition. If, for ex-
ample, only the Dutch government could be brought before the Court for failure to 
comply with its obligations under the Nitrates Directive, but not the Polish govern-
ment for the same kind of breach, farmers in the latter country would gain con-
siderable economic advantages.13 We believe therefore that this kind of differen-
tiation should be ruled out, as it would seriously endanger the uniform application 
and enforcement of Community law in the Member States and would create un-
acceptable distortions of competition in the (enlarged) Community/Union.  
 
If one thinks along the lines of making the infringement procedure a voluntary 
one, such a reform should ‘benefit’ all members, the current and the new ones 
alike. The advocates of this ‘renewal’ could point to the fact that the current 
infringement procedure is really unique in the law of international organisations. 
Nowhere else has an independent organ of an international organisation been 
given the (compulsory) power to bring Member States of that organisation before 
an independent judicial organ. Another possible argument in this regard is that 
within the Union there already exists a precedent, namely the preliminary ruling 
procedure under the third pillar. As was pointed out earlier, Member States may 
accept the Court’s jurisdiction under Article 35 TEU but are not obliged to do so.14  
 
Given the unique nature of the infringement procedure in the law of international 
organisations and despite the fact that a precedent already exists in EU law, we 
strongly believe that Member States should not be given the discretion to accept or 
refuse the Commission’s right to bring actions against them for infringement of EC 
law obligations. The main argument is that the procedure of Article 226 EC con-
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stitutes the most important means for the Commission to detect infringements of 
the ‘hard core’ of EC law. 
 
Apart from the fact that it is undesirable to change the nature of the jurisdiction of 
the Commission and, hence, of the Court, it is also highly unlikely that the com-
pulsory nature of the infringement procedure will be changed on the sole assump-
tion that the new members from Eastern Europe will frequently fail to comply with 
their obligations under the EC Treaty.  
 
 
16.3.2 FROM JUDICIAL TO ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION? 
A somewhat less radical idea on how to ‘water down’ the current infringement 
procedure relates to the question which entity should be entitled to give final 
judgment on infringements of EC law by Member States. The power to give the 
final word could be transferred from the Court of Justice to a non-judicial body, 
for example the Council of Ministers of the EU. Judicial supervision would thus be 
turned into a form of administrative supervision.15 In fact, the EC Treaty already 
provides for such forms of supervision by non-judicial bodies. One of the pro-
visions on EMU stipulates that Member States shall avoid excessive budget deficits. 
Where a Member State breaches this obligation it is for the Council to take 
measures for the deficit reduction and it can impose certain sanctions if such 
measures are not taken. It is explicitly stated that the right of the Commission to 
bring action under Article 226 EC may not be exercised.16  
 
It may however be doubted whether one can speak of a ‘trend’ in this direction. In 
this respect it should be repeated that the general procedure of Article 226 EC is 
used to bring Member States before the Court for infringing the core parts of EC 
law. We therefore certainly would not advocate the introduction of this form of 
administrative supervision. More generally, administrative supervision entails 
significant disadvantages in a constitutional system as it erodes at a very funda-
mental level the system of checks and balances. 
 
 
16.4 FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS TO THE INFRINGEMENT PROCEDURE  
It can also be argued that the infringement procedure should be strengthened 
instead of being weakened, given the fact that the new members will probably 
often breach their Community obligations, possibly even more often and more 
seriously than the present Member States. Several measures qualify for con-
sideration in this perspective.  
 
A first possibility is to ‘speed up’ the infringement procedure in order to bring 
Member States more quickly to justice. At the moment the average duration of this 
kind of direct action is almost two years,17 a length which is hardly acceptable if 
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one takes into account the fact that the infringement procedure is the central 
means to make Member States comply with their EC obligations (para. 16.4.1).  
 
A second option worth considering is to introduce a similar procedure in the two 
non-Community pillars. At present, the Commission does not have the power to 
bring Member States before the Court for breach of obligations in the fields of 
foreign policy and co-operation in criminal matters (para. 16.4.2). 
 
 
16.4.1 AN ACCELERATED INFRINGEMENT PROCEDURE? 
As was pointed out above, the infringement procedure consists of an administra-
tive phase and a judicial phase. The length of the entire procedure could be re-
duced considerably if the first, administrative phase was skipped. Such a solution 
would not be completely new, as the EC Treaty already provides for an accelerated 
infringement procedure, albeit only in some specific situations.18 Such a general-
ised change, which would require an amendment of the Treaty, would probably 
encounter fierce opposition from the (new) Member States. It is precisely the ad-
ministrative phase which gives them the opportunity to oppose the objections of 
the Commission, or to comply with the Commission’s demands, for instance by 
amending their national laws. Eliminating this phase would force Member States 
into contentious judicial proceedings almost without warning.  
 
Another argument which could be put forward in this respect is that the Ar- 
ticle 226 action is not the only procedure for rapidly putting an end to infringe-
ments of EC law by Member States: individuals as well may take action against 
their Member State by relying, before the national court, on the EC rule which has 
been breached. As the Court already ruled in 1963, the fact that Article 226  
(ex 169) EC enables the Commission to bring before the Court a State which has 
not fulfilled its obligations, does not mean that individuals cannot plead these 
obligations before a national court. Otherwise all direct legal protection of 
individual rights would be removed.19  
 
Another way to bring Member States more quickly to justice is to ‘copy’ the in-
fringement procedure of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC Treaty) and insert it into the EC Treaty. According to Article 88 
of the ECSC Treaty the Commission shall record the failure of a Member State to 
fulfil an obligation under the ECSC Treaty in a reasoned decision. Subsequently, it is 
up to the Member State concerned – and not the Commission – to initiate pro-
ceedings before the Court within two months of notification of the reasoned 
decision of the Commission. If the Member State does not bring an action before 
the Court, the infringement has been established definitively and it is required to 
comply with the Commission’s decision. If the Member State did take action 
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(within two months) but its action is dismissed by the Court, it should comply with 
the Court’s judgment.20 
 
If the EC Treaty would reverse the roles of the Commission and the Member States 
in this way, it may be expected that fewer cases would be brought before the Court. 
Only in the event that a Member State has sound arguments to contest the Com-
mission’s view would it initiate the judicial phase. In most cases, however, 
Member States would in fact take no further action since they usually admit that 
they are ‘wrong’.21 In this situation the Member State would be required to take the 
necessary measures to comply with the Commission’s decision; a judgment of the 
Court would not actually be handed down. 
 
For this reason – fewer cases will reach the Court – the Due Report considers an 
extension of the present ECSC infringement procedure (to the EC Treaty) as the 
most favourable solution.22 The report rightly adds that the current EC rules on the 
Court’s power to impose pecuniary sanctions (Article 228(2) EC) should remain in 
existence.23 Under this new regime, the second infringement procedure could be 
initiated by the Commission where a Member State does not comply with its de-
cision on the original infringement, provided that this decision has become final 
(because the Member State has not brought the case before the Court within two 
months). This second infringement procedure could also be initiated by the Com-
mission where the Member State concerned does contest the Commission’s orig-
inal allegations before the Court, but where the Court rejects its objections.  
 
 
16.4.2 EXTENSION OF THE INFRINGEMENT PROCEDURE TO THE OTHER EU PILLARS 
The traditional infringement procedure of Article 226 (ex 169) EC is merely an ade-
quate means to address breaches of Community law, that is, breaches of EC Treaty 
provisions or breaches of the provisions of acts of the EC institutions. At the pres-
ent moment there is no possibility for the Commission to bring Member States 
before the Court for breaching their obligations under the other two EU pillars.24  
It is nevertheless quite legitimate to question whether the Commission should not 
be given a similar right in the areas of CFSP and PJCC.  
 
First, as was already pointed in a different context,25 the two non-Community 
pillars will probably have produced an impressive set of ‘hard’ law at the moment 
the first wave of new members will be admitted. Is it not logical to complement 
these far-reaching decision-making powers with an effective compliance mech-
anism at the central level? The common position on Indonesia, for example, clear-
ly lays down that the export of weapons, ammunition and military equipment to 
Indonesia is forbidden.26 A Member State which would sell weapons to Indonesia, 
despite the Union’s embargo, could be brought before the Court if the infringe-
ment procedure were to cover all areas of Union law. At present, such possibility 
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does not exist as the arms exporting Member State does not breach a Community 
law obligation.27 
 
A second argument for introducing second and third pillar infringement proce-
dures is that most of the decisions adopted under Titles V and VI TEU do not have 
direct effect. In particular, the most important PJCC decisions (framework deci-
sions, decisions) cannot be invoked directly by private litigants before the national 
courts, even if the provisions of such third pillar decisions would be perfectly clear 
and unconditional.28 As a consequence, the Court’s (innovative) idea to stimulate 
the ‘vigilance’ of the citizens by means of the direct effect of Community law29 does 
not offer a satisfactory solution as far as PJCC decisions are concerned. This makes 




16.5 TRANSFER OF JURISDICTION TO THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE 
Until now, only the Court of Justice is competent to deliver judgments under 
Article 226 EC.30 The next accession may however require a (partial) transfer to the 
Court of First instance of jurisdiction to hear and determine this kind of direct 
action. In practice, most of these cases under Article 226 EC do not raise any com-
plex or controversial legal issues, as Member States usually admit that they have 
indeed breached one of their obligations. Notably in the many cases where a 
Member State is accused for non-implementation of EC Directives, the only de-
fence is that due to internal practices it was ‘too late’. For this reason, most judg-
ments under Article 226 EC are delivered by the Court sitting in chambers of three 
or five judges. 
 
Given this state of affairs, which presumably will not change significantly after 
Eastern enlargement, there seem to be good reasons to transfer jurisdiction to the 
CFI once the Union consists of some 25 or more members. This transfer should 
however be accompanied by a right of appeal for the Commission and the Member 
States against the CFI’s judgment. In this way the intervention of the Court of 
Justice is secured and, hence, consistency can be guaranteed.31  
 
From their contribution to the IGC 2000, it can be deduced that the two Courts 
themselves would EC is (partially) transferred to the CFI. As a rule, these Courts 
wish to maintain a right of appeal against judgments of the CFI in direct actions; 
only in case the matter has already been judicially considered (Community trade 
mark cases, staff cases if such cases were to be dealt with by a board of appeal) 
recourse to the Court of Justice may be restricted.32 
 
Unlike the elimination of the administrative phase (discussed above), the transfer 
of jurisdiction to the CFI could be realised without amending the Treaty. A decision 
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of the Council would be sufficient, although the Council would be required to act 
by unanimity and only at the request of the Court of Justice and after consulting 
the European Parliament (Article 225(2) EC). The Treaty therefore already 
provides for a rather flexible response to future developments.  
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17 ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION: SERIOUS 
BREACHES OF FUNDAMENTAL EU PRINCIPLES BY 
MEMBER STATES 
The Amsterdam Treaty solemnly proclaimed that “the Union is founded on the 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States” 
(Article 6(1) TEU). Although this lofty statement may not come as a complete sur-
prise – it could be considered as a mere reiteration of earlier declarations and case 
law – the insertion of this new EU provision is of such great practical importance 
since it is linked to a number of institutional provisions.  
 
First, respect for the Union’s most fundamental principles constitutes the main 
condition for any accession. According to Article 49 TEU only a European State 
which respects the principles set out in Article 6(1) TEU may apply to become a 
member of the Union. The prospect of Eastern enlargement was one of the main 
reasons for inserting this new requirement. Although a similar condition for 
accession was already laid down by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 
(the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities), the additional ‘value’ of Article 49 
TEU is that it forms part and parcel of the Union’s primary law and therefore lays 
down legally binding norms. It should however be admitted that the ‘real’ value of 
Article 49 TEU depends to a very large extent on the interpretation given to this 
provision by the fifteen Member States: they decide whether an Eastern European 
country satisfies the substantive requirements of Article 6 TEU and thus whether or 
not this country will be admitted as a new member. 
 
The second institutional provision is of interest after the actual accession of a new 
member: respect for the principles of Article 6(1) TEU should be secured within the 
framework of the supervisory mechanism of Article 7 TEU. In case a member 
breaches one or more of the fundamental Union principles, it may be confronted 
with certain sanctions which can be imposed by the Council of Ministers of the 
European Union. As this report focuses on the post-accession period, the proce-
dure of Article 7 TEU will be analysed in some further detail (para. 17.1). Sub-
sequently the impact of this new sanction mechanism on Member States is dis-
cussed (paragraph 17.2) and a few possible reforms, in particular regarding the 
role of the Court, are considered (paragraph 17.3). 
 
 
17.1 BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE SUPERVISORY MECHANISM 
The procedure laid down in Article 7 TEU can be divided into three parts. During a 
first stage the Council should determine the existence of a ‘serious and persistent’ 
breach by a Member State of one or more of the fundamental principles mentioned 
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in Article 6 TEU (cited above). The Council should meet in the composition of the 
Heads of State or Government and they should act by unanimity. Logically, the 
vote of the representative of the government of the Member State concerned (not 
necessarily one of the CEECs but also – for example – Austria) is not taken into 
account.1 The Council should act on a proposal by one third of the Member States 
or by the Commission, after it has invited the Member State concerned to submit 
its observations. Although the ‘co-operation’ of the Commission is thus not re-
quired, the Council cannot act unilaterally: it is not without significance that the 
Council should obtain the assent of the European Parliament prior to the adoption 
of the decision determining that a serious and persistent breach exists.  
 
Where a determination on the existence of a serious breach has been made, the 
Council shall, at a second stage, decide on the sanctions to be imposed. The Coun-
cil may (not must) decide to “suspend certain of the rights deriving from the ap-
plication of this [EU] Treaty” to the Member State in question, including the voting 
rights of that Member State in the Council.2 This decision on the imposition of 
sanctions is to be taken by a qualified majority, again without taking into account 
the (weighted) votes of the Member State concerned.3 
 
Although the types of sanctions are rather vaguely described – apart from the 
suspension of voting rights – presumably the drafters of the Amsterdam Treaty 
had the suspension of financial advantages in mind, notably the suspension (or 
withdrawal) of the attractive sums of money from the various structural funds. In 
our view, Article 7 sanctions cannot take the extreme form of suspension of EU 
membership as such. Such a complete exclusion cannot be considered to be a sus-
pension of a right “deriving from the application of the Treaty”. Moreover, an ‘exit 
provision’ should explicitly be introduced by way of Treaty amendment, as the 
possibility to ‘throw a member out of the Union’ should have a very clear legal 
base.  
 
Finally, at a third stage, the Council may decide to vary or revoke the measures it 
has taken on the suspension of rights in order to respond to subsequent changes.  
 
For the sake of completeness, it is noted that the sanction mechanism described 
above, should be distinguished from two other human rights issues recently under 
debate in the Union. The first is the idea of accession of the European Commu-
nities (or the European Union) to the European Convention on the protection of 
Human Rights (ECHR). This idea does not seem very relevant to the issue discussed 
here, namely the protection of fundamental rights at the national level. This ac-
cession would primarily affect the Union’s institutions; their acts and measures 
would have to be in conformity with the ECHR and, if not, the Strasbourg super-
visory mechanism may be put in motion against them.4 Thus, even if the EC would 
have the competence to accede to the Human Rights Convention,5 breaches of 
human rights by national authorities would still have to be brought to the at-
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tention of the Strasbourg Court under the ‘ordinary’ complaint procedure of 
Article 34 ECHR.6  
 
More recently, the Cologne European Council came up with the idea of drawing up 
a ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’.7 Although both the con-
tents and the legal status of this document are still far from clear,8 it would seem 
that the Charter – like the EC/EU accession to the ECHR – would primarily affect the 
acts of the U institutions (and, possibly, acts and measures of other EC/EU organs, 
such as Europol).9 Massive human rights violations by national authorities - such 
as, presumably, the discrimination of the Roma population in many CEECs – would 
still be dealt with by the ‘supreme’ Council under Articles 6 and 7 TEU, as the 
Charter would only apply to human rights violations committed by central EC/EU 
entities. 
 
If, however, the personal scope of application of the EU Charter would also cover 
human rights violations committed by national entities – an option which in our 
view is to be preferred – 10 then there is a risk that the Charter will overlap with the 
Article 7 TEU mechanism. Should human rights violations by national authorities, 
such as police forces, be dealt with under the Charter (including its enforcement 
mechanism) or by the Council under Article 6(1) in conjunction with Article 7 TEU? 
In order to come to a meaningful delineation, it could however be stated in the EU 
Charter that it merely covers ad hoc violations of human rights. The imposition of 
sanctions by the Council under Article 7 TEU would then still have a useful place in 
the EU system of protection of human rights, namely as an instrument to address 
massive and more structural human rights violations. 
 
 
17.2 THE IMPACT ON THE (NEW) MEMBER STATES 
From this brief analysis it clearly follows that, at present, the Council (in its 
‘highest’ composition) plays a predominant role in case a Member State is accused 
of seriously and persistently breaching one or several of the most fundamental EU 
principles. The first of the various decisions – regarding the determination of a 
serious breach – must be taken by ‘all but one’. It must therefore be seriously 
questioned whether this system of sanctions will function effectively in an enlarged 
Union. Moreover, Article 6 TEU formulates the principles in a rather general and 
vague way. Does, for example, the treatment of children in Romania or the treat-
ment of the Russian minority in Estonia amount to a ‘serious and persistent 
breach’ of the principle of respect for human rights? Likewise, the treatment of the 
Roma Minority of a number of the candidates is worrisome. But will the Council 
really be prepared to impose sanctions on countries like Bulgaria or Romania? 
Because of this political context, the actual impact of the Article 6/7 mechanism is 
very hard to predict. 
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Another factor complicating the assessment is that the (vast majority of the) 
Member States may decide to impose ‘informal’ sanctions on the renegade, thus 
escaping the official route which was introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty. In this 
respect it should be said that the recent Austria sanctions have created a bad 
precedent. By opting for the ‘extra-EU’ route, fourteen Member States circum-
vented the procedural guarantees of Article 7 TEU. In particular, the European 
Parliament was not asked to give its assent, nor was the Austrian government 
invited “to submit its observations”. Moreover, by doing it the unofficial way, the 
central criterion of Article 7 was not given serious attention: does government 
participation of a democratically elected political party amount to a ‘serious and 
persistent’ breach of one of the fundamental EU principles of Article 6 TEU?  
 
 
17.3 POSSIBLE REFORMS: FROM ADMINISTRATIVE TO JUDICIAL 
SUPERVISION? 
Given the strong political influence in cases of breaches of fundamental EU prin-
ciples by Member States, it is important to consider whether there are ways to 
improve the supervisory mechanism.  
 
One way to improve the application of the procedure of Article 7 EU could be to 
involve the Court in a much more intensive way. The current system of adminis-
trative supervision would then change into a ‘traditional’ system of judicial review. 
We however believe that it is still too early to propose such a fundamental change. 
Practice must first of all teach us how the Council in its highest composition will 
actually deal with serious breaches of fundamental rights and principles, both by 
the older and the new members. 
 
Another important argument for maintaining the status quo for the time being, is 
that the Court of Justice can play an important role in the protection of funda-
mental rights anyway. As is well known, the Court has always played this crucial 
role, despite the absence in the Community legal order of a written list of specific 
human rights (such as the freedom of expression and the right to family life). It did 
so by ruling that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles 
of Community law whose observance the Court must ensure. In order to identify 
the content of these fundamental rights, the Court draws ‘inspiration’ from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from international 
human rights treaties, in particular the 1950 European Convention on Human 
Rights. As a result, the Court will not accept Community measures (such as Regu-
lations and Decisions) which are incompatible with the human rights thus recog-
nised and guaranteed.11 The Maastricht Treaty codified this body of case law in 
Article F(2) TEU (now Article 6(2) TEU: “The Union shall respect fundamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as 
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they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as 
general principles of Community law”. The Amsterdam Treaty added that the 
Court has jurisdiction in relation to Article 6(2) TEU.12 
 
With regard to national legislation, however, the Court is more reluctant. It will 
only rule on the compatibility of that legislation with fundamental rights–- as 
unwritten principles of Community law – where national legislation “falls within 
the field of application of Community law”. This will be the case where national 
law was specifically designed to implement or secure compliance with rules of 
Community law.13 Where national legislation lies outside the scope of Community 
law, the Court will rule that it has no jurisdiction to assess the compatibility of that 
legislation with fundamental rights. Indeed, in several cases the Court has held 
that for this reason it had no jurisdiction.14  
 
On the basis of this analysis we conclude that turning the Article 7 mechanism into 
a form of judicial supervision would not make much of a difference. Moreover, the 
Court would have to decide on very sensitive political issues since Article 6 deals 
with serious and persistent breaches and not with ad hoc violations of fundamen-
tal rights. 
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18 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Enlargement to the East will impose an enormous strain on the traditional way to 
which the European Union has become accustomed working. One rather obvious, 
but limited, way to secure adequate adaptation is to ensure in the current IGC, that 
the EU institutions and some of its procedures are adapted in order to meet the 
heady numerical challenge posed by significant expansion to the East. 
 
In our view the most profound problem is the fact that the legal and administrative 
systems of the countries in question are simply not used to the challenges that they 
will be expected to meet once the accession process is successfully completed. 
What will this reality mean for the hitherto sacrosanct principles of Community 
law and in particular for its extensive reliance on the legal and administrative sys-
tems of Member States? To what extent will this new phenomenon require change 
in the system of the EU itself? Surprisingly these key questions have received little 
in-depth examination and have barely been the subject of serious inquiry to date. 
At the same time the significance of the answers is not modest. In our view the 
response of the EU and of its legal and administrative systems to the coming chal-
lenges will constitute the litmus test for the nature and scope of the future evo-
lution of the EU. 
 
Already prior to enlargement certain trends can be signalled which provide key 
indications of the directions in which solutions and possible answers can be 
sought. One response is to avoid the entire incorporation issue as much as 
possible. If important parts of the Union’s acquis are not declared applicable to the 
CEEC then there obviously can be no incorporation problem (and hence no 
application and enforcement problem).1  
 
Many ideas are already in circulation which go in this direction, ranging from the 
development of a ‘core acquis’ for the internal market 2 to Giscard d’Estaing and 
Helmut Schmidt’s suggestion that the ‘Euro-countries’ should intensify their co-
operation to such an extent that they create their own institutions in order to take 
the integration process substantially further.3  
 
In addition, the flexibility clauses of the Amsterdam Treaty provide a means of 
avoiding incorporation problems after accession. The current ideas to relax the 
conditions of Article 11 TEC would surely form a partial solution in this regard and 
must be considered as a likely outcome of the current intergovernmental process. 
Yet, as we have seen, this ‘solution’ also has serious disadvantages, both of an eco-
nomic and of a legal nature.4 Moreover, even if closer co-operation is possible 
under the (less restrictive) conditions laid down by the Treaties, the CEECs may 
nevertheless be bound by secondary legal instruments if the majority of Member 
States decide to outvote the minority. Regarding the core areas falling within the 
EC Treaty this alternative route seems to be irrelevant in any event, since these 
areas will continue to be excluded from the closer co-operation process. 5 
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Despite the existence of a range of options which can be made attractive in a 
colourful ‘flexibility’ kaleidoscope6 we proceed on the assumption that important 
parts of the existing and new acquis will acquire legal force for the new Members 
States and that all aspects of the incorporation process will become relevant in 
those circumstances. This report has sought to highlight the fact that for its in-
corporation into national legal orders, EC/EU law has always heavily relied upon 
the quality, capacities and willingness of national entities, both administrative and 
judicial.7 
 
Even in those areas where considerable powers of enforcement have been imposed 
on a central institution (for example, the Commission) the trend is not towards 
enhancement of those centralised powers but rather of further and at times rather 
radical decentralisation of those very powers, especially in the light of enlarge-
ment. The example of the recent White paper of the Commission in the field of 
competition policy speaks volumes in this respect. Moreover it indicates quite 
clearly that such far-reaching decentralisation is not to be understood as con-
stituting part of what will ultimately be a hierarchical relationship (in this instance 
with the Commission) but rather of creating and reinforcing horizontal networks 
of information and analysis among national enforcement authorities. 8 
 
The fact that there has been over the course of the past decade or two a consider-
able increase in the number of Community Agencies which operate in specific 
policy-making areas does not indicate in any sense a trend away from decentral-
isation of general enforcement and application tasks. Rather the latter phenom-
enon can as well be categorised in ‘partnership’ terms with national authorities 
and other national actors. Moreover it must at all times be recalled that within the 
scope of Community powers at any rate the remit of such agencies is very discrete. 
In other words, the functions of such Agencies are either technical in nature or 
informational and they do not enjoy independent decision-making powers which 
challenge the institutional balance between the various EU institutions.9  
 
At the same time, some qualitative differences may be discerned with regard to the 
situation in non-EC policy-making areas and in particular with regard to police co-
operation and judicial co-operation in criminal matters. In these areas a somewhat 
different trend seems to give more decision-making powers to ‘organs’ in this con-
text. Europol is a rather far-reaching and obvious example; other examples fall 
more within the normal EC model of collecting information and ‘networking’ 
(Eurodac and Eurojust, for example). In any event it is clear that there is more dis-
cretion in these areas for the EU to prefer a more centralised mode of co-operation. 
At the same time the transformations in the executive sphere “have not had as a 
consequence a shift from decentralisation to centralisation, but rather have deter-
mined the emergence of networks aggregating domestic administrations, national 
experts, private bodies and supranational administrations in order to achieve 
specific objectives”.10 
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As it is likely that this state of affairs will, grosso modo, still exist in a Union of 
some 25 members, the EU institutions can probably only play a secondary role. Co-
operation, backing up, monitoring are the catchwords in this regard; primary 
responsibility for the transposition, application and supervision of EU law will 
however remain in the hands of the national state powers.11 For example, shutting 
down of the Bulgarian nuclear powers plants cannot be unilaterally imposed by the 
Commission; a review of child care institutions will remain the primary responsi-
bility of Romanian administrative organs (health inspection services); and the 
actual treatment of the Russian minority in the Baltic countries will very much 
depend on the quality and willingness of national administrative and judicial 
organs.  
 
From the perspective of the Union certain choices in terms of legislative or other 
techniques can assist the process of assisting the legislators and administrators of 
the new members in better incorporation of EU law as well as developing the re-
quisite ‘hardware’ that will facilitate that process. Of particular importance to 
these national authorities is the question whether the Union decides to adopt non-
binding rules or ‘hard’ law.12 We highlighted the fact that within the core of the 
internal market legislative techniques are available which do enable some degree 
of diversity to be maintained in individual Member States (in particular the tech-
niques of optional and minimum harmonisation).13  
 
With regard to the newer areas of EU policy making, which embrace extremely 
sensitive areas of national sovereignty and which are often highly culturally 
specific (for example, criminal law, police law), we encourage the eu to support a 
process of developing common principles within certain areas of the law. These 
principles could function as role models for the new CEECs when it comes to 
adapting their relatively new legal systems to the strains and demands of full EU 
membership.14  
 
Much attention has been devoted to possible reforms to the EU’s judicial system 
from the perspective of enlargement. The general conclusion is that one should be 
reluctant in demolishing the work that has been done in the last fifty years or so. 
The coming enlargement could even be considered as an important reason for 
further improving the system, precisely in the interest of the millions of new 
‘citizens of the Union’. Hence, it was emphasised that the issue of the workload of 
the Court should be balanced against the interests of these individuals (and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, the CEEC judges). 15 
 
More specifically, we discussed and expressed our views on several judicial actions 
which are of particular relevance to the national actors. Regarding judicial super-
vision exercised by national courts, both the Court of Justice and the Community 
legislator could make a contribution to further improving access to justice at the 
national level, as well as improving the effectiveness of national legal proceed-
ings.16 Expectations should, however, not be too high since the principle of nation-
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al procedural autonomy will continue to occupy a central place. This means that to 
a very large extent the new members will be free to build and renovate their judi-
cial buildings.17 The more radical solution of centralisation of judicial review could 
remove this Member States’ freedom, but any genuine centralisation is not only an 
unrealistic option but would also increase the workload of the two EU Courts to an 
unbearable degree.18 
 
Considerable attention has, therefore, been given to the three preliminary refer-
ence mechanisms which directly link the national courts to the Court of Justice. In 
line with our general idea on being reluctant in destroying what has been reached 
so far, it was argued that only a soft variant of ‘filtering’ could be considered: 
national courts could be encouraged to become more reluctant in asking the Court 
for help.19 Other more radical ideas, such as the limitation of national courts em-
powered to refer, ‘hardcore’ filtering by the Court, deletion of the written phase, 
and also conferral of jurisdiction on the CFI, should in principle be rejected.20  
It could even be argued that there is some room for further improvements, in par-
ticular by amending the two special preliminary reference procedures. In this 
respect it was emphasised that there are good reasons for  
1 making lower courts competent to refer questions on asylum matters to 
Luxembourg,  
2 giving the Court compulsory jurisdiction regarding preliminary rulings on 
criminal matters, and  
3 introducing in the same area of Union policy the rule that supreme courts are 
bound to refer in case they consider a judgment of the Court on the inter-
pretation or validity of PJCC law necessary.21  
In addition, the Court could become less strict in case national courts do not pro-
vide sufficient background information, earlier referred to as the process of re-
moving the existing filters (or ‘de-filtering’).22 
 
The resulting problems regarding the Court’s workload should be solved, pri-
marily, in the organisational sphere: more financial resources for one of the most 
important judicial organs in Europe; more personnel (in particular for the trans-
lation of judgments in all official EU languages); more judgments delivered by 
chambers of the Court; and also, for example, more power for the Court to amend 
its own Rules of Procedure.  
 
Although we fully realise that an emphasis on the interests of national (CEC) courts 
and private (and public) litigants is not very popular at the moment, this is indeed 
the best path to follow, as will become clear in the future. The alternative – strict 
conditions regarding admissibility of preliminary references, or even no possibility 
at all – will seriously endanger the uniform interpretation and application of EU 
law in a Union which has get used to the idea that it consists of a very large and 
diverse group of members.  
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Regarding direct actions, the impact of the so-called infringement procedure on 
the new members was emphasised.23 It the light of this assessment it was argued 
that it is quite legitimate to question whether the Commission should not be given 
a right to bring Member States before the Court for breaches of CFSP and/or PJCC 
obligations. Moreover, unlike the preliminary reference procedure, it seems a good 
idea to transfer jurisdiction under Article 226 EC to the CFI. Of course, a right of 
appeal for the Commission and the Member State concerned should be introduced 
simultaneously.24  
 
Regarding the potentially sensational sanction mechanism for serious and per-
sistent breaches of fundamental EU principles, we argued that first time must tell 
how this procedure will operate in practice. Only at a later stage a change from 
administrative to judicial supervision might be envisaged. Remaining the status 
quo in this way would mean that the Court of Justice continues to exercise its 
supervisory functions in relation to ad hoc violations of fundamental (human) 
rights – violations on a larger scale and of a more structural nature remain the 
primary responsibility of the ‘highest’ Council. 25  
 
All in all, the role of the Court in the construction of the evolving EU legal order is a 
pivotal one. Its fundamental constitutional task of fleshing out the appropriate 
balance between the requirements of unity and the reality of ever-increasing diver-
sity is one which must be taken seriously and which it must be given a chance to 
perform. 
 
The overall conclusion is that there are no simple solutions to the expected prob-
lems regarding the various aspects of the process of incorporating EU law into the 
national legal orders of the many newcomers. This is essentially because there 
exists a very serious tension between, on the one hand, the ‘high’ political wish to 
enlarge the Union in an unprecedented way, and, on the other hand, ‘low’ political 
issues such as the actual application, enforcement and supervision of EU law in 
Eastern Europe. This does not mean however that in the struggle to find the ap-
propriate balance between unity and diversity the unique integrative force of the 
EU as a highly sophisticated international organisation must be changed beyond 
recognition. 
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